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The "last resort rule" dictates that a federal court should refuse
to rule on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a
nonconstitutional basis.1 The United States Supreme Court recently
avoided a classic opportunity to apply the rule in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District.2 Instead, the Court decided a controversial
Establishment Clause issue without exploring other possible grounds
for its decision.3 The Zobrest decision highlights the divergence among
the Justices as to whether the Court should regard the last resort rule
as an absolute dictate or a discretionary maxim. The lack of coherent
standards for applying the rule has resulted in accusations of manipu-
lation. The dissenters in Zobrest, for example, charge that the majority
casts aside proper judicial restraint in its zeal to reach the Estab-
lishment Clause issue.4 But whoever is correct on the rule in Zobrest,
and even if the Court properly reached the Establishment Clause issue,
Zobrest may have heightened opportunities for litigants to manipulate
the rule in the future.
Courts and scholars have failed to focus on the criteria for the last
resort rule; this essay fills that gap. This Article explores the justifica-
tions for the general avoidance doctrine and its component, the last
resort rule. The avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions,
urged as early as 1833 byJohn Marshall,5 has been explained by concerns
regarding federal courts' credibility, the final and delicate nature of
judicial review, and the paramount importance of constitutional adju-
dication. After exploring those justifications, this essay concludes that
several are less weighty. Prudential concerns for maintaining appropri-
I When a federal court is faced with a choice of ruling on a statutory, regulatory or consti-
tutional basis, the Supreme Court has instructed the lower court to decide the federal constitu-
tional issue only as a last resort. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ('The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of."). For further elucidation of the avoidance doctrine and its seven
components, including the last resort rule, see infra Section II.
2113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
3 Id. at 2469.
4 Id. at 2469-70.
5 Ex parte Randolph, 20 F Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
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ate separation of powers and respect for other governmental actors,
however, justify retaining a flexible last resort rule.
This essay concludes that as long as judicial review does not im-
plicate voiding legislative or executive action, a federal court should
readily dismiss the prudential guidance of the last resort rule. In
contrast, a court confronted with the argument that it should void
legislative or executive action because of constitutional interpretation
should generally resolve the case subconstitutionally by use of the last
resort rule. While a court would not offend the separation of powers
principle by deciding the constitutional issue, the application of the
last resort rule suggested in this essay allows a court to serve the interest
of sharing the constitutional interpretive power with the other branches.
Circumstances may arise, however, when a court should reach the
constitutionality of a statute even though nonconstitutional grounds
remain. For example, a court should reject the last resort rule if
non-majority rights could only be effectively redressed by reaching the
constitutional ground of decision in a particular case even if the con-
stitutional ruling requires invalidating legislative or executive action.
Federalism concerns dictate a similar application of the last resort rule
in order to afford appropriate deference to state law development and
state court decisions. This Article concludes that while Pullman absten-
tion 6 is an inappropriate application of the rule, at least one branch
of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine demonstrates
appropriate use of the rule.
Section I of this Article identifies the disagreement within the
Supreme Court as to application of the last resort rule and demon-
strates the contemporary relevance of the rule by examining Zobrest.
Section II provides historical background by focusing on Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, in which Justice Louis D. Brandeis identified
seven components of the avoidance doctrine.7 The section demon-
6 Pullman abstention is discussed infra at notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
7 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 298,346-48 (1936). The avoidance doctrine
flows from the familiar canon of judicial self-restraint, and is intertwined with the debate over
the proper scope of federal judicial review and the allocation of power among the three branches
of the federal government and the states. It is also premised on the "delicacy" and "finality" of
judicial review of legislation for constitutionality, concerns regarding the credibility of the federal
courts, and the "paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system." Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court of LA, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) (reciting a non-exhaustive list of
grounds supporting the avoidance doctrine); see also Paul A. Freund, Introduction to ALEXANDER
M. BIcKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTIcE BRANDEIS xvii (1957) (Judicial self-re-
straint is premised on an "awareness of the limits of human capacity, the fallibility ofjudgment,
the need for diffusion of power and responsibility, the indispensability of husbanding what powers
one has, of keeping within bounds if action is not to outrun wisdom."). The persuasive force of
these grounds for application of the last resort rule will be explored in Section IV infra.
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strates the significant overlap between the avoidance doctrine and
other jurisdictional or justiciability barriers. The avoidance doctrine
reflects such other justiciability doctrines as standing and ripeness, and
permeates jurisdictional doctrines such as Pullman abstention and the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine. The Article singles
out the last resort rule as a logically distinct portion of the avoidance
doctrine which deserves its own critical examination because it can
serve as a separate bar to constitutional adjudication. Section III re-
views problems evident in implementation of the last resort rule. Fi-
nally, the Article analyzes the justifications for the last resort rule in
order to delineate in Section IV when federal constitutional questions
should be decided only as a last resort.
I. RECENT CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAST RESORT RULE
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, a deaf child and his
parents sued an Arizona school district because the district refused to
provide a sign language interpreter for the child after he transferred
from a public school to a parochial school.8 Plaintiffs challenged the
refusal to provide an interpreter on a variety of constitutional and
statutory grounds 9 including the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), 0 its Arizona counterpart," an IDEA regula-
tion, 2 the Arizona Constitution,13 and the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.14
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought relief from a federal district court,
which concluded that state provision of an interpreter at the parochial
school "would likely offend the Establishment Clause."'1 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed solely on the Establishment
Clause ground.16 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reached the
same issue, but reversed on the merits, finding that if it provided an
interpreter the school district would not violate the Establishment
Clause.'7 The Court held only that the Establishment Clause does not
8113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464 (1993).
9 Id at 2464-65.
1020 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
'IAuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761 to -772 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
1234 C.ER. § 76.532(a)(1) (1992).
13Aeiz. CONST. art. II, § 12.14 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
15 Zobrest 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
16Zobrest v. California Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 Zobres; 113 S. Ct. at 2465-69. Although the deaf child had completed his high school
education by the time the Supreme Court faced this issue, the controversy was not moot because
[Vol. 35:1003
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bar the school district from furnishing an interpreter in a parochial
school. 18 Lower federal courts will now have to determine whether the
Zobrests are entitled to reimbursement for the interpreter's expenses.
The school district may ultimately prevail if the lower courts find that,
although the school district was not barred from furnishing an inter-
preter, it was also not required to furnish an interpreter for the Zobrest
child.19
In arguing its case before the lower courts, the school district
raised other defenses in addition to the Establishment Clause bar. The
district argued that the provision of an interpreter violated the Arizona
Constitution, was not required by federal statute (IDEA) or regulation,
and was, in fact, precluded under a federal funding regulation prom-
ulgated under the IDEA °20 The Court declined to address these "unre-
lated" issues because the parties pressed only the federal constitutional
issue at both the appellate level and the summary judgment stage of
the district court proceedings.21 The majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, recognized the validity of the "prudential rule of
avoiding constitutional questions";22 however, it acknowledged that the
Court, on appeal, is presented with the "entire case," including "'non-
constitutional questions actually decided by the lower court as well as
nonconstitutional grounds presented to, but not passed on by the
lower court.' 23
In the Zobrest litigation, however, the Court found it significant
that only the First Amendment questions-rather than nonconstitu-
tional grounds-were "pressed" before the Ninth Circuit and that, even
before the district court, "the parties chose to litigate the case on the
federal constitutional issues alone."24 The Court concluded: "Given this
posture of the case, we think the prudential rule of avoiding constitu-
tional questions has no application. The fact that there may be buried
in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself
enough to invoke this rule."2 The Court then proceeded directly to
his parents sought reimbursement for the cost of hiring a private interpreter while the child
attended parochial school. Id at 2464 n.3.
18 Id. at 2469.
19 Id at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).20 Id. at 2464-65.
21 d. at 2465-66.
22 Zobres 113 S. Ct. at 2465-66.
23Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985)).
24 Id
251d. at 2466 (emphasis added). The dissent takes issue with this characterization of the
record, finding that weighty nonconstitutional grounds had been raised by the parties, not
"buried" in the record. Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the First Amendment issue, without considering any other grounds for
the decision.2 6
The four dissenters-Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter and
Stevens--accused the Zobrest majority of "unnecessarily address[ing]
an important constitutional issue, [and] disregarding longstanding
principles of constitutional adjudication." 27 The dissent argued that
resolution of the constitutional issue was not necessary because the
Court could have remanded the case for consideration of alternative
grounds of resolution.28 The lower courts then could have construed
the IDEA so as not to require an interpreter for a parochial student so
long as the school district provided an interpreter in a public school
which the child could attend. The majority, however, merely held that
governmental provision of an interpreter did not establish religion and
that the Establishment Clause did not bar provision of an interpreter.20
In further proceedings, the lower courts may determine-despite the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause ruling-that the IDEA does not
require provision of an interpreter in a parochial school when one is
available in a public school in the district.30
The parties deliberately did not brief or argue the "weighty" non-
constitutional issues because, according to the dissent, they wanted a
ruling on the Establishment Clause question.3' The dissenters would
have heeded the avoidance doctrine by vacating and remanding the
case for consideration of the nonconstitutional questions, despite the
parties' failure to brief these issues: 'The obligation to avoid unneces-
sary adjudication of constitutional questions does not depend upon
the parties' litigation strategy, but rather is a 'self-imposed limitation
on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction [that] has an importance
to the institution that transcends the significance of particular contro-
26 Id. at 2466.
27 Zobres, 113 S. Ct. at 2469 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined the dissent in
its entirety. Justices O'Connor and Stevens joined the dissent in its discussion of the avoidance
doctrine, but not on the First Amendment issue. Justices O'Connor and Stevens would have
vacated the earlier decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of the
statutory and regulatory issues that might "moot" the constitutional issue. Id. at 2475 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
281d. at 2470 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For instance, an IDEA regulation prohibited use of
federal funds for "[r]eligious worship, instruction or proselytization." Id. at 2465 n.7. In addition,
article II, § 12 of the Arizona Constitution, on which respondents relied, bars public funding for
"any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment."
Id. at 2470 & n.1 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
29Id. at 2469. Note that the Court did not conclude that the IDEA requires an interpreter
to be provided. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
30 Zobrest 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1L Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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versies. "'32 The dissent asserted that the avoidance doctrine is the most
"deeply rooted" doctrine of constitutional adjudication."3 The doctrine
amounts to a "fundamental rule of judicial restraint," which has re-
ceived the sanction of time and experience.3 4 The dissent imbued the
avoidance doctrine with constitutional weight by relying on earlier
Supreme Court precedent relating the avoidance doctrine to the case
or controversy requirement.35 The dissenters also likened it to the
"policy against entertaining political questions. '36 Despite those consti-
tutional linkages, however, the avoidance doctrine is most commonly
classified as a prudential rule ofjudicial self-restraint.3 7
By refusing to apply the avoidance doctrine-or more specifically,
one of its components, the last resort rule-the Court in Zobrest ap-
pears to have transferred to litigants the ability to control whether a
federal court decides constitutional issues. Granted, litigants-as mas-
ters of their complaints--can always control outcomes to some extent
by limiting their claims during a suit. The dissent, however, accused
the parties in Zobrest of "seeking what amount[ed] to an advisory
opinion" by using litigation strategy to shape a controversy which could
not normally be adjudicated by the Court.3 8 This is an overstatement:
32 L (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982)).
33Id at 2469-70 (quoting Specter Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105
(1944)).
34 Id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. World Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)); see also Freund, Introduction to
BIcKEL, supra note 7, at xv, xvii (calling the principle of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
decisions part ofJustice Brandeis' "canon ofjudicial self-restraint").
35Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947). The Court in Rescue
Army recognized that "often the line between applying the [avoidance] policy or the [case or
controversy] rule is very thin." Id. at 570-71; see also id. at 571 n.37 (citing cases where the
avoidance doctrine was applied "to avoid the necessity of deciding a case or controversy jurisdic-
tional question, when constitutional issues were at stake on the merits").
56 Id. at 570. Even where justiciability and other jurisdictional requirements are met, federal
courts sometimes refuse to rule on certain allegations of governmental misconduct under the
political question doctrine. It is not entirely clear whether the doctrine, in all of its manifestations,
is constitutionally required. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Alexander M. Bickel,
The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. Rxv. 40 (1961); Gerald
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in
Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964);J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question
Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. Rxv. 97 (1988); Terrance Sandaow, Comments on Powell v. McCormack,
17 UCLA L. REv. 164 (1969); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HAtv. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (political question doctrine can serve as "a tempting refuge from the
adjudication of difficult constitutional claims").
37 See, e.g., Zobres 113 S. Ct. at 2466; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
58 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2471 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Federal courts cannot issue decisions
in hypothetical controversies; a real dispute between truly adverse litigants, which can be re-
dressed by the court, is necessary to the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III. Flast v.
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the litigants in Zobrest met the requirement of a real dispute between
adverse parties, even though both sides sought resolution of the con-
stitutional issue.39
In addition, to avoid rendering an advisory opinion, the federal
court decision must have some effect on the outcome of the dispute. 40
It is not immediately clear what practical effect the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause precedent in favor of the Zobrests will have on the
outcome of the dispute. If the lower federal courts conclude that the
Zobrest's action is nevertheless barred on statutory grounds, the Court's
decision will have no practical effect on the concrete controversy.41 On
the other hand, if we assume that the parties' true concern only
extended to the Establishment Clause, the Court's ruling in Zobrest
might end the concrete dispute. In other words, if the school district
was willing to pay for an interpreter in the religious school as long as
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 43 (1989)
(ban on advisory opinions preserves separation of powers by "keeping the courts out of the
legislative process").
Thus, in 1793, the initial members of the Supreme Court refused to issue an opinion in
response to President Washington's request for legal advice regarding a potential, future dispute.
3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OFJOHNJAY 486-89 (Johnston ed., 1891); see PAUL M.
BATOR, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 65-70
(3d ed. 1988); see also RobertA. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, inJUDGEs AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 10 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (discussing essays of Frank
M. Coffin, Maeva Marcus and Emily Field Van Tassel, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY).
Previously, at the Constitutional Convention, proposals to create a Council of Revision
"composed of the President and members of the national judiciary" to review proposed congres-
sional legislation for constitutionality were rejected. CHEmERINSKY, supra, at 6-7; see also Frank
M. Coffin, The Federalist No. 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress, inJUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY, supra, at 25; Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van
Tassel,Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, inJUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY, supra, at 35-42 (discussing the federal judiciary's concern with
avoiding prejudgment of political issues that might come before the judiciary later within a case
or controversy).
39 The requirement of a real, live dispute between adverse parties, in order to avoid an
advisory opinion, is also reflected in the standing doctrine's injury requirement and the justici-
ability doctrines of ripeness and mootness. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 45; see also Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Il: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93
HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979).
40 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 45 (requires a "substantial likelihood that a federal court
decision in favor of a claimant will bring about some change or have some effect"). Professor
Chemerinsky notes that this requirement is similar to both the standing doctrine's "redressability"
component and the doctrine of mootness, and cites the difficulty of applying the redressability
requirement in particular circumstances. Id. at 46, 63-71.
41 This uncertain practical effect on the parties is in stark contrast to the perceived public
effect of the Court's constitutional ruling. Public reaction to the Court's decision was swift and
widespread. See, e.g., EuGENE REGISTER-GUARD, June 24, 1993 (lead editorial) (calling decision
the "most interesting-and troubling-of the term"); David G. Savage, Court O.Ks Tax Money
Use in Church Schoo; LA. TIMES, June 19, 1993, at Al; Raising Church-State Questions, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 27, 1993, at 72.
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the Establishment Clause did not bar the funding, the decision would
end the dispute.
Alternatively, if the Court had decided that the Establishment
Clause barred public provision of an interpreter at a parochial school,
the effect of the Court's decision on the outcome of the dispute would
have been clear: the dispute between the litigants would have ended.
Thus, the dissenters may overstate the case when they charge that the
Zobrest opinion constitutes an unconstitutional advisory opinion. The
advisory opinion bar does not preclude eager litigants from presenting
a concrete Establishment Clause dispute to a federal court for judicial
determination. Instead, it precludes federal courts from giving legal
advice on hypothetical questions which other branches of government
may freely ignore.42
Although Zobrest did not amount to an advisory opinion, the
Court's resolution of the Establishment Clause issue, while nonconsti-
tutional grounds remained, violated an absolute last resort rule. Even
when other hurdles are cleared, the last resort rule can function as an
independent bar to constitutional adjudication. The last resort rule
requires an additional inquiry: whether a federal court should avoid
deciding the constitutional issue and remand for consideration of
nonconstitutional grounds or confront and decide the constitutional
issue, as the Court did in Zobrest. The next Section separates the last
resort rule from the avoidance doctrine's other components to provide
guidance concerning its appropriate application.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
This Section examines the historical development of the avoid-
ance doctrine and its components to clarify how the last resort rule is
distinct from other components, but overlaps in terms of general
justifications for avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. This
Section demonstrates that the last resort rule is a significant compo-
nent of the doctrine because it can serve as an independent barrier to
constitutional adjudication. Additionally, by exploring the relationship
between components of the avoidance doctrine and other justiciability
doctrines, this Section underscores the prudential nature of the last
resort rule. Finally, by highlighting the context surrounding the doc-
42See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (declaring that it would be a violation
of separation of powers principle for Supreme Court justices to recommend to the Secretary of
War what amount of benefits should be paid to a veteran ifSecretary could refuse to follow Court's
recommendation); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (holding
that the Court has no jurisdiction to give the President a ruling on administrative decisions
concerning international air routes if the President can disregard or modify the Court's ruling).
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trine's primary formulation, this Section supports the conclusions de-
veloped in Section IV regarding the rule's appropriate use.
A. The Avoidance Doctrine in Ashwander 43
Justice Louis D. Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority provides the most significant formulation of
the avoidance doctrine.44 The Brandeis formulation had no effect on
the outcome of the case because theJustice concurred in the plurality's
judgment, and the plurality considered and decided the properly pre-
sented constitutional issues. Nevertheless, the Brandeis concurrence
represents the primary legacy of Ashwander.45
431 refer to it as a "doctrine," as do the dissenters in Zobrest.Justices Brandeis (in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)), Frankfurter (in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) and Rutledge (in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549 (1947)) call it a
"policy."
4297 U.S. 288 (1936).
The Ashwanderconcurring opinion is generally and justly regarded as the crowning
statement of one of the truly major themes in Brandeis'judicial work: the conviction
that the Court must take the utmost pains to avoid precipitate decision of constitu-
tional issues, and that it must above all decide such issues only when it is absolutely
unable otherwise to dispose of a case properly before it.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 2-3; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 87
(1987); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 42; PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR
THE PEOPLE 307-08 n.41 (1984).
4Justice Stevens has called the Ashwanderconcurrence "one of the most respected opinions
ever written by a Member of this Court." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Brandeis, a leader of the progressive movement prior to his judicial
appointment, offered a broad framing of the avoidance doctrine. The doctrine was adopted
heartily by Felix Frankfurter, who was attacked as too "liberal" while a Harvard scholar and an
active supporter of New Deal programs. See HELEN SHIRLEY THOMS, FEUX FRANKFURTER:
SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 19-20 (1960); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIx FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 20-22 (1991). This tool ofjudicial restraint espoused by
"liberals" was in large part inspired by the response of Brandeis and Frankfurter to the activist
"conservative" Court of the 1930's, which struck down legislation as infringing on freedom of
contract and other doctrines such as substantive due process.Joseph P. Lash, Introduction to FRol
THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 57-58 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER
DIARIEs]. In recent years, we more frequently have seen doctrines ofjudicial restraint criticized
when used by "conservative"jurists. See, e.g., Gerald M. Gallivan, Supreme CourtJurisdiction and
the Wyoming Constitution:Justice V.JudicialRestraint 20 LAND &WATER L. REV. 159 (1985); Steven
M. Kahaner, Separation of Powers and the Standing Doctrine: The Unwarranted Use of Judicial
Restraint, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1074 (1988); Christopher A. Crain, Note,Judicial Restraint and
the Non-Decision in Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 263 (1990); see
also Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense ofJudicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993,
at Al (referring to the Ginsburg nomination and noting surprise at a "liberal" jurist espousing
techniques ofjudicial restraint).
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1. The Plurality's Decision
In Ashwander, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of a congressional program of development of the Wilson
Dam.46 The plaintiffs, preferred stockholders of the Alabama Power
Company, had unsuccessfully protested to the corporation about its
contracts with the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"). Plaintiffs then
brought suit against the corporation, the TVA, and others alleging
breach of contract and advancing a broad constitutional challenge to
the governmental program. 47 The plurality did not reach the broadest
constitutional questions presented by plaintiffs, but instead upheld
Congress's constitutional authority to dispose of electric energy gener-
ated at the dam and validated the contracts. 48
At the outset, the plurality rejected the government's argument
that the preferred stockholders did not have standing to bring the
suit.49 The plurality then considered the scope of the constitutional
issue presented. The plurality found the scope "limited to the validity
of the contract" between the parties, rather than extending to the
broad challenge to the validity of the entire TVA program.50 Although
the plurality refused to issue an advisory opinion on plaintiffs' broader
hypothetical and contingent constitutional claims, it did review the
46 297 U.S. 288, 315 (1936).
4 7 M at 316-17. Plaintiffs argued that the federal government, through the TVA, was under-
taking a "coup" which "would open every essential industry and service to direct and permanent
governmental competition." Id. at 291-92. Plaintiffs challenged the TVA program's "validity in
every respect, in its entirety, and in detail, asserting that the program and all of its essentials, the
means employed to promote it, its dominant objectives, and its arbitrary methods, do not consist
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution." Id, at 293; see also id at 317.
48 1& at 339-40. The district court below did not reach plaintiffs' request for general decla-
ratory relief, but it did annul the contract at issue, enjoin transfer of the transmission lines and
auxiliary properties, and enjoin the municipal defendants from "making or performing any
contracts with the [TVA] for the purchase of power." M at 317. The court of appeals reversed,
finding that Congress had the constitutional authority to construct the Wilson Dam and dispose
of the surplus energy thereby produced. I& at 318.
49Id at 318 ("while their stock holdings are small, they have a real interest and there is no
question that the suit was brought in good faith").
50 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 324. The government urged the Court to construe the constitu-
tional issue narrowly. Id at 310-11. The Court agreed: "The pronouncements, policies and
program of the [TVA) and its directors, their motives and desires, did not give rise to ajusticiable
controversy save as they had fruition in action of a definite and concrete character constituting
an actual or threatened interference with the rights of the persons complaining." Id. at 324.
The single dissenter, however, would have considered plaintiffs' allegation that, "while pre-
tending to act within their powers to improve navigation, the United States, through corporate
agencies, are really seeking to accomplish what they have no right to undertake-the business of
developing, distributing and selling electric power." I& at 357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). After
evaluating the evidence presented in support of that allegation, he found that the trial court's
ruling should be affirmed. Id at 372.
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constitutionality of the legislation insofar as the plaintiffs had pre-
sented facts of a legitimate "case or controversy."51 Based on the con-
crete dispute before the Court, the plurality concluded that Congress
had war and commerce power authority to construct the Wilson Dam.5 2
The plurality also found that the disposal of the electric energy gener-
ated pursuant to the provisions of the contracts at issue was lawful.53 Thus,
the judgment in Ashwander, in which Justice Brandeis concurred, ulti-
mately did not avoid a constitutional issue.
2. The Reasoning of the Concurrence
Justices Cardozo, Roberts and Stone joined the Brandeis concur-
rence. The concurring Justices would have affirmed the court of ap-
peals' judgment "without passing on it," although they agreed with the
plurality's conclusion on the constitutional issues it reached.5 4 The
court of appeals had decided, like the plurality, that Congress had the
constitutional authority to construct the Wilson Dam and dispose of
the surplus energy thereby produced.5 The concurrence, however,
would have affirmed this judgment without reaching the merits be-
cause of other infirmities in plaintiffs' case.56
Brandeis primarily objected to plaintiffs' standing.5 7 His concur-
rence disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the preferred stock-
holders could bring the action because they had already voiced their
complaints to the corporation without success. Brandeis concluded
51 d1 at 325. The government claimed that the shareholders' complaints werp "premature,"
"hypothetical" and "speculative" because some portions of the constitutional challenge were
based on future, contingent acts. Id. at 313-14. The plurality agreed:
[P]laintiffs had no right to demand that the directors should start a litigation to
obtain a general declaration of the unconstitutionality of the [TVA] in all its
bearings or a decision of abstract questions as to the right of the [TVA) and of the
Alabama Power Company in possible contingencies.
Id. at 325; see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ban on advisory
opinions.
52Ashwander, 297 US. at 326-30.
13 Id at 330-40 (construing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
54 Id at 341. The Court also thought that the district court should have dismissed the case.
Id
55 Id. at 318.
56 Id. at 341.
57 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 341; see alsoALsxAER M. BicKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 119-21 (2d ed. 1986) (calling Brandeis' primary
concern in Ashwander one of standing). This standing concern is nearly identical to Brandeis'
primary objection to jurisdiction in the draft Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S. 13 (1922),
opinion. See infra notes 76 and 149 for discussion of Atherton Mills. Heated debate over appro-
priate access to the courts for those asserting corporate interests was reflected in several cases
during the 1936 term. Felix Frankfurter and Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court
at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577 (1938).
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that plaintiffs had no "right to interfere" in corporate governance
under the substantive law, and because the stockholders could allege
no injury which the substantive law recognized, they lacked standing
to bring suit.58
The concurrence then raised an equity bar to the requested relief.
The preferred stockholders could not show the "irreparable injury" to
their property rights necessary to obtain relief in equity.59 Plaintiffs had
only a limited interest in the corporation and the district court had
made no finding that the proposed transactions with the TVA endan-
gered their property interests. 6
Brandeis also examined other potential hurdles standing between
the Court and the constitutional issues. He concluded that the power
company was estopped from bringing a challenge and thus its stockhold-
ers had lost any right to bring a challenge.61 Finally, according to Brandeis,
even if plaintiffs had standing under the substantive law, "courts should, in
the exercise of their [equitable] discretion, refuse an injunction unless
the alleged invalidity is clear."62 Brandeis urged a presumption in favor of
the validity of any legislative act until "its violation of the [C] onstitution
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt" 63 But the particular part of the
Ashwander concurrence that has become famous is its articulation of
"[t]he practice in constitutional cases."6 In describing that "practice,"
Brandeis set out a broad formulation of the avoidance doctrine.
3. 'The practice in constitutional cases"
Brandeis characterized judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislative acts as a grave and delicate power for use by fallible, human
judges only when its use cannot conscientiously be avoided.6 5 This
58 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 341-44. The concurrence attempted to distinguish prior decisions
in stockholder cases where the Court had rendered decisions, Id. at 349-52, or, alternatively,
urged that the prior cases be overruled. Id. at 352-53.
59 Id at 344-45.
60 Id. at 345.
61 d. at 353-54.
62 Id. at 354.
63Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 355 (quoting Justice Washington's opinion in Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 270 (1827)).
64 Id. at 345.
65 Id. Brandeis notes early in his opinion that the Supreme Court "has frequently called
attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act
of Congress." Id.
Although Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander is the primary cite for the modem
formulation of the avoidance doctrine, ChiefJusticeJohn Marshall had cautioned previously that
no questions of "greater delicacy" can be presented to the federal judiciary than those involving
a constitutional challenge to a legislative act. Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va.
1833) (No. 11,558). He instructed that if such questions "become indispensably necessary to the
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reluctance to use the power of judicial review was, according to Bran-
deis, predicated on the separation of powers principle that one branch
must not "encroach upon the domain of another."6 6 Brandeis iden-
tified two prominent limitations on the federal judicial power based
on the separation principle: the "case or controversy" requirement and
the rule that federal courts have no power to render advisory opin-
ions.67 Brandeis linked a host of justiciability doctrines, including po-
litical question and standing inquiries, to these limitations.
Brandeis recited traditional Article III jurisprudence by recogniz-
ing well-established constitutional limits on the federal judicial power.
The concurrence's theme of judicial restraint is not inconsistent with
the plurality's decision: a federal court should only decide an actual
Article III controversy when the facts present one, and should refuse
to render an advisory opinion on the entire TVA program. Brandeis
then relied on the avoidance doctrine to argue that the Court should
not reach the merits of the constitutional issue.
Brandeis described how the Court had developed "prudential"
rules-meaning nonconstitutional, self-imposed restraints-by which
to avoid "passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions"
presented to it, despite having jurisdiction to hear them.68 He de-
scribed the avoidance doctrine as consisting of a "series" of seven rules:
1) 'The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding...";69
case," they must be decided, but "if the case may be determined on other points, ajust respect
for the legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly
assailed." Id. (emphasis added). In Ex parte Randolph, the Chief Justice, while riding circuit,
considered a challenge to a congressional act which provided that treasury agents could issue
warrants for military officers charged with disbursing public funds who failed to pay and settle
their accounts at the Treasury Department. The court concluded that the terms of the act did
not apply to an officer temporarily acting as the ship's purser due to the death of the regularly
commissioned purser and granted his petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 242.
66Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 355. Brandeis concludes his discussion of the avoidance doctrine
in Ashwander with this warning: "One branch of the government cannot encroach upon the
domain of another, without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree
on a strict observance of this salutary rule." Id. (quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700,
718 (1871)). For a different cast of the separation of powers principle, see generally Robert A.
Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, inJuDGcS AND LEGISLATORS 14 (Robert A. Katzmann ed.,
1988) (discussing separation of powers as "'separated institutions sharing powers,' not separate
institutions"); David B. Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a
Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L. REv. 211 (1973).
67 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345-46; see also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
I-I: Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 240-54 (1985); Brilmayer,
supra note 36, at 302-03 (the avoidance principles espoused in Ashwander contemplate "an
essentially passive judicial role").
68Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346.
69 Id.
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2) 'The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." 70
3) 'The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied."''
4) The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question,
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed.72
5) The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute unless the plaintiff was injured by operation of the
statute.73
6) 'The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits."7 4
7) Even if "serious doubt[s]" concerning the validity of an act
of Congress are raised, the Court will first ascertain "'whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided."' 75
Several of these rules overlap entirely or in significant measure
with well-recognized requirements that govern the federal courts through
judicial interpretation of the "case or controversy" requirement of
Article III. In exploring the connections between the avoidance doc-
trine and other justiciability doctrines, I group the seven rules into
three clusters. This Article first examines the rules of the avoidance
doctrine which overlap with other constitutional requirements for jus-
ticiability and jurisdiction: rules 1, 2, 3 and 5. Next, the Article consid-
ers the rules which are largely prudential: rules 6 and 7. Finally, the
remainder of the Article focuses on rule 4, which I term the "last resort
rule."
70 1M at 346-47 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885)). In Liverpool, the Court remanded a case for further factual development to avoid
issuing an advisory opinion on hypothetical facts. 113 U.S. at 39.
7 1Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (quoting Liverpoo4 113 U.S. at 39).
72 d.; see also Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR.
L. REv. 125, 182 (1970) ("The logic of constitutional law demands that nonconstitutional issues
be disposed of first, state constitutional issues second, and federal constitutional issues last."); see
discussion of comity infra Section IV.
73 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347-48.
74 Id- at 348.
751d (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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a. Rules Related to Article HI Requirements
The first rule bars collusive suits as not proper cases or controver-
sies under Article III. Brandeis relied on Atherton Mills v. Johnston, in
which the Court dismissed a challenge to a congressional act regulating
child labor as moot, in support of the first rule.76 As Professor Alexan-
der Bickel points out, however, Atherton Mills was "a case of quite
conventional mootness, hardly apt as an illustration ofjudicial self-re-
straint in constitutional litigation."77 Mootness, ajusticiability doctrine,
serves to ensure that a controversy is "live" and in need of judicial
resolution.78 For Brandeis, however, Atherton Mills represented the
issue of collusive suits arranged to obtain fast and convenient adjudi-
cation of constitutional issues.79 Brandeis elaborated on this concern
76 Atherton Mills v.Johnston, 259 U.S. 13,16 (1922); see Bicr, supra note 7, at 3. Brandeis
also cited to Chicago & Grand Trunk R.R v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892), which is described
in Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman: "the parties sought a ruling as to whether a particular
passenger rate was unconstitutionally confiscatory, having stipulated all the debatable and con-
tingent facts which otherwise might have rendered a constitutional decision unnecessary." 367
U.S. 497,529 (1961). Atherton Mills presented a challenge to the Child Labor Tax Act by a father
of a child employed at a mill, who alleged that his son was about to be discharged due to the
impact of the tax. The father alleged that the resultant loss of his son's wages would injure him.
He sought an injunction to keep the mill from discharging his son. The district court issued the
injunction, finding the Act unconstitutional, and the case proceeded to the Supreme Court.
Atherton Mills, 259 U.S. at 13-15.
77 BicKxL, supra note 7, at 3.
78 
"Mootness avoids unnecessary federal court decisions, limiting the role of the judiciary
and saving the courts' institutional capital for cases truly requiring decisions." CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 38, at 110. The justifications for the doctrine, however, have been challenged. Susan
Bandes, The Idea of a Case 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: TheExample of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 605 (1992) (maintaining that mootness
should not be considered a constitutional doctrine, but merely a prudential rule); Henry P.
Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82YALE L.J. 1363 (1973) (debunking
the judicial capital argument as "assum[ing] precisely what is at issue").
79 BcnEiL, supra note 7, at 3. Brandeis argued in the unpublished opinion in Atherton Mills
that the suit was merely a collusive, fictitious controversy between the parties--essentially, the
child employee and employer. Id. at 6-7. The draft mirrors Brandeis' suspicion, articulated
elsewhere, of claims for declaratory relie SeeWilling v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274,
289 (1928) (Brandeis said declaratory relief was beyond the scope of Article III judicial power,
and there was no statutory authorization for declaratory judgments at that time). The Court, in
Nashville, Chattanoga & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, disagreed. 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (declaratory
judgements are justiciable as long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding,
involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy). In 1934, Congress passed the Declaratory
Judgement Act, the constitutionality of which was upheld in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937). Despite the Declaratory Judgment Act, the avoidance doctrine still
applies. Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497,506 (1961) (stating that the declaratory judgment procedure
"does not permit litigants to invoke the power of this Court to obtain constitutional rulings in
advance of necessity"); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 573 n.41 (stating
that discretionary element in declaratoryjudgmentjurisdiction offers convenient instrument for
making effective the avoidance doctrine).
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in Ashwander, declaring judicial review of the constitutionality of legis-
lative acts legitimate only as a last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversies between individu-
als.80 It was never the thought that a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts, by means of a friendly suit, an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act.81
Federal courts thereby safeguard their limited power by barring
such nonadversarial, fake controversies-suits over which an Article III
court has no jurisdiction. 2 The Court has described the requirement
of standing as "closely related" to the rule against entertaining friendly,
collusive suits. 83 This first rule of avoidance also overlaps with the
ripeness requirement, discussed in conjunction with the second rule.
The second rule of the avoidance doctrine mirrors the ripeness
requirement in that it obliges federal courts to refrain from deciding
a dispute prematurely.84 The primary rationale for the ripeness doc-
trine, another justiciability doctrine arising from the case or contro-
versy requirement, is "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract dis-
agreements.""' In a leading case on ripeness, Poe v. Uliman, the Court
8 0Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346.
81Id. (quoting Chicago and Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)); see
Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 300 (stating that Article III's case or controversy requirement "has
traditionally been understood to include the power to resolve abstract legislative issues, including
constitutional issues, but only as a necessary byproduct of the resolution of particular disputes
between individuals"); Bandes, supra note 78.
8 2 See, e.g., BxcKEL, supra note 7, at 1-2 (in the draft opinion of Atherton Mills, Brandeis
pointed out that neither the employee, his father nor the mill wanted the challenged tax). In
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), decided the same term as Ashwande, Justice
Brandeis joined Justice Cardozo's dissent from the majority opinion, which reached the merits
of a constitutional challenge to Congressional legislation regulating the coal industry in an
obviously collusive suit. In Carter Coal the president of a coal company sued the coal company
to enjoin its compliance with the legislation and the Court found the legislation in part uncon-
stitutional. 298 U.S. at 278-79.Justice Cardozo reasoned in dissent, quoting Brandeis in Ashwan-
der, that there was no need to reach some of the constitutional issues. Id. at 325.
For other instances in which the Court has rejected collusive suits, see United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 303-05 (1943) (action dismissed where plaintiff sued defendant at
defendant's request, and defendant financed and controlled litigation); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1911) (suit between Native Americans and federal government was not
justiciable merely because Congress had passed legislation authorizing suit to resolve constitu-
tional question when their interests were not adverse).83Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
84 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961) (dispute not ripe due to no real threat of
criminal prosecution of plaintiffs under Connecticut statute regulating contraceptives); see Bril-
mayer, supra note 39; Gene R. Nichol Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 153
(1987); Jonathan D. Varat, Variablejusticiability and the Duke Power Case 58 T)Fx. L. Rxv. 273
(1980).
SAbbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); see Rescue Army v. Municipal
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relied on the avoidance doctrine to set the stage for its decision that
the controversy was not ripe. 6 In Poe, Justice Felix Frankfurter de-
scribed the Ashwander rules as arising from the "historically defined,
limited nature and function of courts" and from the separation of
powers principle.87
Moreover, the rules recognize that adjudication within an adver-
sary system functions best in the presence of "a lively conflict" between
actively pressed antagonistic demands, making resolution of the con-
troverted issue a practical necessity.88 Frankfurter termed the justici-
ability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness as merely "several
manifestations . . . of the primary conception that federal judicial
power is to be exercised to strike down lgislation... only at the instance
of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened
with harm, by the challenged action."89 The first two rules of the
avoidance doctrine are, thus, closely linked to well-recognized justici-
ability requirements, and serve as alternative, but not distinctive, limi-
tations on the federal judicial power.90
Court of L.A,, 331 U.S. 549,575-85 (1947) (dispute not ripe because an incomplete factual record
rendered a constitutional decision premature).
86367 U.S. 497, 498, 508-09 (1961) (the Court declined to address plaintiffs' claim that
Connecticut law regulating contraceptive use and related medical advice violated Fourteenth
Amendment). As the Court instructed in Poe "'The best teaching of this Court's experience
admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity.'" IiL
at 503 (quoting Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 333 (1949)).Justice Frankfurter
wrote for four members of the Court, andJustice Brennan concurred in the judgment, although
four justices would have reached the constitutional issue. Id. at 509-55.Justice Brennan's brief,
pivotal opinion in Poe reasons that the "true controversy" was the opening of large scale birth-
control clinics and that that controversy simply was not ripe on the facts because the State had
made no "definite and concrete" attempt to enforce the law. Constitutional adjudication could
await such factual development, he concluded. Id at 509.87 Id. at 503 (Such concerns "press with special urgency in cases challenging legislative action
or state judicial action as repugnant to the Constitution."); see also United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 104 (1947).
Frankfurter appears to have carried the torch ofjudicial restraint for Brandeis after the latter
retired from the Supreme Court. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124-29 (1948). Frank-
furter was, in fact, deeply involved in discussing judicial restraint with Brandeis long before
Frankfurter was appointed to the bench. As early as September 19, 1922, Brandeis had written a
letter to Frankfurter outlining major principles ofjudicial restraint that would later appear in the
Ashwanderopinion. "HALF BROTHER, HALF SON": THE LETTERS OF LouIs D. BRANDEIS TO FELix
FRANKFURTER 110 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991) [hereinafter BRANDEIS LET-
TERS]; see also Judith Resnik, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection, 71 CAL. L. REv. 776 (1983)
(book review) (personal and political affiliations of two jurists).
88 Poe, 367 U.S. at 503.
ss1& at 504 (emphasis added); see also BicKE., supra note 57, at 116 (both the time lag and
the "flesh-and-blood facts" of a dispute secured by standing and the requirements of a case or
controversy are important to legitimating judicial review of legislative action).90 It is not surprising that many rules within the avoidance doctrine overlap with other
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Standing, another justiciability doctrine derived from the "case or
controversy" requirement, requires a litigant to allege that she has
personally suffered or imminently will suffer a concrete injury, fairly
traceable to the defendant's conduct, and that the court's decision will
likely redress her injury.91 Standing includes both constitutional and
prudential components. 92 The third rule of the avoidance doctrine
requires federal courts facing constitutional issues to rule no more
broadly than the precise facts require.93 This rule may reflect the
justiciability and jurisdictional rules: the doctrine is a "series of rules" reflecting the larger canon
of judicial self-restraint. Such rules are frequently and perhaps necessarily overlapping. See
BICKEL, supra note 57, at 71, 118, 125.
91Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, § 2.3. For back-
ground on the standing doctrine, see Bandes, supra note 78; Gene R. Nichol, Injury and the
Disintegration of Article HII, 74 CAi. L. REv. 1915 (1986) (and earlier articles by Nichol cited
therein); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SurroLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983); Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1432 (1988).
92 After the constitutional analysis (i.e., the injury and causation analysis), federal courts
perform a second inquiry as a matter of "judicial self-governance." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 124, 129 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It seems wholly
inappropriate, as a matter ofjudicia self-governance, for a court unnecessarily to decide a difficult
constitutional issue in a case in which nothing more is at stake than remuneration for professional
services."). The Court in Flast v. Cohen cites "uncertainty" surrounding justiciability doctrines due
to a blending of constitutional and prudential considerations. 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (quoting
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). As an example, the Court selects the Ashwander
rules, which are prudential--"they find their source in policy, rather than purely constitutional,
considerations." However, several of the cases cited by Justice Brandeis in illustrating the rules of
self-governance articulated purely constitutional grounds for decision. Id. The Court concludes
that such blending is unavoidable.
93 The third rule of the avoidance doctrine was a focus of debate in the Court's controversial
decision upholding the constitutionality of Missouri's abortion statute in Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Webster, the five-member majority upheld the state's prohibition
against public employees assisting in the performance of an abortion which was not necessary to
save a mother's life. Id. at 507, 522.
In an amicus brief, the Bush administration urged the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade 410
U.S. 113 (1973). SeeBarry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 665-66
(1993).Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment, but refused to join the plurality's
opinion to the extent it "reexamine[d] the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade." Webster, 492
U.S. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation to Roe
deleted). Apparently, her refusal to join in a draft majority opinion circulated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist which attacked Roe was critical to prevent the Court from overturning Roe in Webster.
Benjamin Weiser & Bob Woodward, Tlze Marshall Files, WASH. PosT, May 23, 1993, at Al.
O'Connor relied on the second and third rules of the avoidance doctrine to argue that the Court
could affirm the constitutionality of the Missouri statute without reaching the broader constitu-
tional issue of the validity of Roe. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia urged the Court to reach the validity of Roe and he called O'Connor's reliance
on the avoidance doctrine to evade reconsideration of Roe irresponsible. Id. at 532, 537 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He argued that the application of the
avoidance doctrine was not in question because the Court could not avoid deciding the consti-
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fact-specific focus of the standing inquiry. The fifth rule, which re-
quires that the challenged legislation injure the plaintiff, mirrors the
injury and causation components of the standing requirement.94
Cases construing the prudential component of the standing doc-
trine have relied on the avoidance doctrine. Prudence gives rise to,
among other doctrines, the prohibition against third-party standing.95
One policy underlying the prohibition is the desire to avoid unneces-
sary constitutional adjudication.96 The Court, in explicating the bar
against third-party standing, has described Brandeis' Ashwander rules
as "offering the standing requirement as one means by which courts
avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications. 97 A second prudential
restriction is the bar against finding standing for a generalized griev-
ance-a harm shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
group of citizens. 98 The Court has also linked this standing bar to the
tutionality of the Missouri statute. The only dispute was over the breadth of the constitutional
ruling once the Court determined it would reach the merits of the constitutional issue, i.e.,
whether the Court should use Roe v. Wade as the benchmark, or something else. Ia at 532-33.
He argued that although the third rule of the avoidance doctrine-not formulating a rule of
constitutional law broader than that required by the facts of the case-"is a sound general
principle, it is often departed from when good reason exists." Id at 533. He concluded that good
reason for departure existed in Webster.
The debate between Justices O'Connor and Scalia demonstrates significant disagreement
among the Court as to the appropriate use of the third rule of the avoidance doctrine. Although
that debate is of critical importance to the development of constitutional dialogue, this Article
focuses primarily on proper application of the avoidance doctrine's fourth rule-the last resort
rule-and leaves an analysis of proper use of the third rule for another day.94 The doctrine of standing, like the avoidance doctrine, reflects "the Art. III notion that
federal courts may exercise power only 'in the last resort, as a necessity,' and only when adjudi-
cation is 'consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution through thejudicial process.'" Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (quoting
Chicago & Grand Trunk R.R. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968)); see David Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 37 (1984) (arguing that standing requirements are applied more stringently to
constitutional claims).
95 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 124 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Brandeis' discussion of the avoidance doctrine in Ashwander). As a general rule, a litigant can
raise only her own claims, not those of another Third party standing also implicates the basic
concept of a right, which includes the power of the rightholder to choose whether to exercise
that right.
96 Id at 124 n.3 (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A second justification
for the prohibition against third-party standing is the Court's need for effective advocacy through
a traditional controversy. Id.
97Id at 114.
98See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (person injured by police
"chokehold" could seek damages but had no standing to seek injunctive relief against future use
of "chokehold" because he could not show sufficient likelihood of imminent personal harm and
irreparable injury); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974).
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avoidance doctrine: the requirement of an individualized injury serves
to ensure that "there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial
review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party."99
Indeed, the avoidance doctrine may be an early formulation of the
justiciability doctrines.100
Rules three and five of the avoidance doctrine thus echo concerns
addressed by the constitutional and prudential limitations of standing
and ripeness. In some cases, the tenets of the avoidance doctrine
addressed above-rules 1, 2, 3 and 5-may serve to buttress the con-
clusion that a case is notjusticiable, or that a case is justiciable but the
court will voluntarily decline to exercise its jurisdiction for prudential
reasons. The avoidance doctrine as set out in these rules functions
primarily as a supplement to established doctrines of standing and
ripeness. The last resort rule provides the critical, separate barrier to
constitutional adjudication contained within the broader avoidance
doctrine. This Article will return to clarify that rule and explore its
applications after a brief review of the two remaining tenets of the
avoidance doctrine.
b. Rules Reflecting Largely Prudential Concerns
The sixth rule of the avoidance doctrine provides that a court will
not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has benefitted from the statute.'0 ' In support of this rule, Brandeis
cited cases in which a party waived its ability to object to a statute
because the party had pursued benefits afforded under the statute in
one proceeding prior to challenging the statute's constitutionality in a
separate judicial proceeding.102 The Supreme Court later distinguished
9 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added) (challenging holding of Armed Forces
Reserve commissions by members of Congress under Incompatibility Clause of Article I, § 6).
The Court also found the avoidance doctrine "particularly applicable" in Schlesinger because the
litigants sought an interpretation of a constitutional provision which had not been construed by
the federal courts.
10°Professor Erwin Chemerinsky suggests that the justiciability doctrines differ today from
Brandeis' formulation because of the Court's extensive development of them in the 1960's and
1970's. Letter dated February 24, 1994 (on file with author). Cass Sunstein claims thatJustices
Brandeis and Frankfurter, as progressives and New Deal enthusiasts, "developed doctrines of
standing, ripeness, and reviewability largely to insulate agency decisions from judicial interven-
tion." Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLum. L. Rav. 1432,
1437 (1988). Similarly, the avoidance doctrine aims at deferring to legislative and executive
decisions.
101 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347-48.
102 See, e.g., Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411-12 (party which instituted
proceeding for valuation of its stock under state legislation could not afterward assert the
constitutional invalidity of legislation); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581,
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cases relying on the "estoppel to sue" doctrine as being cases in which
"litigants had received or sought advantages from the statute that they
wished to attack, advantages other than the mere right to sue."1 03 The
sixth rule may be of relatively little importance today. To the extent
the estoppel principle was based on a doctrine forbidding parties from
asserting inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings,10 4 Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8 (a) now expressly allows alternative or inconsistent
allegations. Moreover, broad modern principles of claim preclusion
appear to address adequately the concern reflected in the cases cited
for the estoppel principle. 10 5
The seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine derives from the
familiar canon of statutory construction that a statute "ought not to be
construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction
remains available."106 The canon and the rule are identical and, not
surprisingly, often used interchangeably.10 7 Indeed, the canon of statu-
tory construction is grounded in large part upon the well-established
practice of not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily.08 The
seventh rule poses an alternative to the directive of the last resort rule.
Through statutory construction rules, it may also be possible to avoid
a constitutional question. 10 9
598-600 (1888) (party which commenced Court of Claims proceeding for compensation after its
property was taken for public use could not separately challenge the constitutionality of the taking
in federal court).
103 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm., 330 U.S. 127, 139-40 & n.14 (1947).
104 See Leonard v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 198 U.S. 416, 423 (1905).
105 Of course, administrative law developments in the last fifty years would also affect the
current validity of this principle.
10tRustv. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759,1771 (1991) (quoting EdwardJ. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). A discussion of statutory
construction is beyond the scope of this Article. A classic review of the canons is presented in
Karl N. Llewellyn's Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (arguing that the canons of
statutory construction provide little guidance because, for every canon, there is an equally weighty
opposing canon). See RIcHARD A. POSNR, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CssIS AND REFoRm 276 (1985)
(giving examples of same). A collection of intriguing Articles commemorating Llewellyn's attack
on the canons and examining the reemergence of the canons in recent judicial decisions is
contained in Symposium: A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv.
529 (1992).
107 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1788 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).Justice O'Connor also cites the second
rule of the avoidance doctrine in support of her argument not to decide constitutional questions
in advance of the strictest necessity. Id. As in Zobres4 she refused to join the dissenters in Rust
who reached the merits of, and dissented from the majority on, the constitutional issues. See also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (interpreting age discrimination statute so as to avoid
Tenth Amendment problem).
10° United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1984).
109 See Rust, Ill . Ct. at 1759.
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B. The "Last Resort Rule"
Finally, this essay considers the last resort rule, a largely prudential
rule which gives a federal court the power to avoid a constitutional
issue in some circumstances. This rule dictates that, even if all other
jurisdictional and justiciability obstacles are surmounted, federal courts
still must avoid a constitutional issue if there is any other ground upon
which to render a final judgment. Because the last resort rule can
function as a distinct barrier to constitutional adjudication, it merits
separate consideration.
1. The First Application
Brandeis cited two examples in Ashwander of the "most varied
application" of the last resort rule. First, as between two potential
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question
of statutory construction or general law, the Court will only decide the
latter.110 To the extent the question involves statutory construction and
a plausible interpretation of the statute might obviate the need for
constitutional review, this example replicates the seventh rule of the
avoidance doctrine discussed above. To illustrate this first application,
Brandeis relied primarily on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co."' In Siler, a railroad company challenged an order by the Kentucky
railroad commission setting maximum rates on commodities trans-
ported by rail within the state.1 2 The company asserted a takings claim
and a Commerce Clause claim under the United States Constitution,
as well as state law claims, including a claim that the commission had
exceeded its statutory authorization in making such an order.113 The
Supreme Court upheld the lower federal court's order enjoining en-
forcement of the maximum rate order. The Court indicated, however,
that the lower court should have enjoined the rate order on state law
grounds, without reaching the federal constitutional grounds." 4
The Court in Siler confirmed that once the lower court properly
determined that it had federal question jurisdiction, the court had the
right to decide either all questions or only the state law questions." 5
"°Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347.
111213 U.S. 175 (1909).
112I at 176-77.
131d. at 177. The Court itself proceeded to review the state law claims, although Kentucky's
highest court had never construed the pertinent statute. The Court concluded that the commis-
sion had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the challenged order. Id. at 194-96.114 Md at 191.
11Id
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The Siler Court stated that where a case can be decided without refer-
ence to questions arising under the federal Constitution, that course
is "usually pursued and is not departed from without important rea-
sons."116 The Court declared it better to decide the case with regard to
the construction of the state statute, and the authority therein given
to the Commission to make the order in question, rather than to
unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in
the record." 7
The Siler Court offered no case precedent or doctrinal ground for
this policy decision. The discretionary nature of the Court's decision
limits the extent to which Siler serves as a primary basis for an absolute
last resort rule. After recognizing the lower court's authority to decide
the constitutional questions, the Court decided to follow the "usual
course" of avoiding such questions if questions of local law would
resolve the dispute. This purely prudential formulation of the rule
allows courts to dispense with the rule for "important reasons."" 8 Al-
though Brandeis prefaced his avoidance doctrine discussion in Ash-
wander by casting the seven rules as prudential, his formulation of the
last resort rule omits this "important reasons" qualification. Thus, an
evaluation of the proper scope of the last resort rule requires a deter-
mination of whether the qualifying phrase should be employed, or
whether the rule should be viewed as an absolute." 9 In Section IV, this
Article concludes that the last resort rule should not be regarded as
an absolute, suggests guidance for future application of the rule, and
requests court elucidation on use of the rule.
"Pullman abstention" represents the most prominent development
of this initial application of the last resort rule after Ashwander. In
Section IV.E.1, this Article rejects Pullman abstention as an illegitimate
application of the last resort rule.
116213 U.S. at 193.
117 The only other case cited by Brandeis for the first application of the "last resort rule" is
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 (1911), in which the Court followed the principle of
avoiding a constitutional issue by ruling on an alternative ground, relying on the Si/er formula-
tion. Both cases involved claims that originated in federal courts seeking injunctive relief under
an Ex parte Young theory. Those types of actions particularly troubled Justice Brandeis because
they could involve intrusive federal court orders and federalism tensions.
118When the Supreme Court instructs lower federal courts to follow the "last resort rule," its
application appears mandatory. In applying the rule itself, however, the Court appears to view
the rule as a flexible one. See infra Section III.
19 See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pulhnan Court
refused to follow its method of disposing of the issues in Siler-rather than decide the state issues
itself, the Court sent the case back to the state court via abstention.
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2. Brandeis' Second Application of the "Last Resort Rule"
The second application Brandeis furnished to demonstrate the
last resort rule in Ashwander is the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine: "Appeals [to the United States Supreme Court] from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judg-
ment can be sustained on an independent state ground."120 When
reviewing judgments of state courts, the United States Supreme Court
only reviews questions of federal law. 2 1 The Court will decline to hear
a case if an adequate and independent state ground supports the
judgment of the state court. 22 The Court reasons that, if a state ground
independently supports the judgment, a decision by the Court on
federal law grounds will have no effect on the outcome of the case and
will amount to an advisory opinion. 23
In Section IV.E.2, this Article distinguishes between two branches
of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, expressing
concerns regarding one application and validating the other. Before
doing so, this Article in Section III traces courts' inconsistent and
problematic implementation of the last resort rule since Ashwander.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAST RESORT RULE
The Court, evaluating implementation of the avoidance doctrine
a decade after Ashwander, concluded that it had worked well, both for
securing individual rights and preserving an appropriate separation of
powers. 2 4 Alexander Bickel likewise defended use of the avoidance
doctrine and the other "passive virtues" by which the Court defers
120297 U.S. at 347.
121 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). State courts are obviously not
inhibited by Article I1's case or controversy requirement and do not necessarily follow the last
resort rule in their jurisdictional limitations. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 529 P.2d 438, 444
(Wash. 1974) (Washington court declined to follow federal rules on mootness because the case
presented "a broad issue of substantial public import" appropriate to resolve merits of dispute).
But see Linde, supra note 72, at 38 ("Every state supreme court, I suppose, has declared that it
will not needlessly decide a case on a constitutional ground if other legal issues can dispose of
the case.").
122 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (requiring Supreme Court review unless
the state court judgment makes a clear statement that the judgment relies on an adequate and
independent state ground deemed sufficient to support judgment).
123 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal law, our review could amount
to nothing more than an advisory opinion").
124 Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 572. The Court said: 'Time and experience have given [the
avoidance policy] sanction. They have also verified... that the choice was wisely made." Id
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constitutional adjudication. He argued that other alternatives yield a
manipulable or unprincipled system.'25 This section demonstrates, how-
ever, that the rule has not been implemented in a neutral and consis-
tent manner so as to diminish the potential for manipulation or pro-
vide, as Bickel hoped, an effective rule of principle. 126 Moreover, the
Court's construction of the rule in Zobrest heightens opportunities for
manipulation by transferring control over its applications from judges
to litigants.
The critical problem facing a judge as she implements the doc-
trine of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions is determining
which constitutional determinations are necessary and when those de-
terminations become necessary. The last resort rule should be the
easiest and most straightforward of the tenets to apply. If, for example,
the last resort rule is taken at face value, it dictates that it is never truly
necessary to resolve a constitutional claim until all other grounds for
ruling are exhausted.
The Court has declared, however, that the avoidance doctrine, in
general, necessitates case by case judgment calls. 127 The Court has used
an ad hoc approach in implementing the last resort rule. Four ap-
proaches to applying the rule are identified here. First, in Zobrest, the
Court determined that the last resort rule does not apply if litigants
fail to press the nonconstitutional issues. 128 Previously, the Court chose
15 Bicxr.L, supra note 57, at 200 ("solutions based on the premise of an obligation always to
decide lead to a manipulative process... or to the abandonment of principle and the involve-
ment of the Court in judgments of expediency, as a second-guesser of the political institutions;
or, more commonly, to both"); see also AL cANDER M. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 121
(1975) ("legal technicalities are the stuff of law").
126 Gerald Gunther eloquently critiqued Bickel's avoidance techniques and their potential
for expedient and inconsistent implementation in Gunther, supra note 36. Suzanne Sherry
criticized the Burger Court for selectively using avoidance techniques, such asjusticiability doctrines,
to avoid enforcing individual civil and criminal rights while vigorously enforcing "majoritarian"
rights. Suzanne Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Communiy from Itself,
70 MINN. L. REv. 611, 617-68 (1986).
127 The Court in 1947 declared that the doctrine necessitates a case by case application. Rescue
Army, 331 U.S. at 574 ("It is largely a question of enough or not enough, the sort of tiing
precisionists abhor but constitutional adjudication nevertheless constantly requires.").
128 Of course, the Court's decision to address the constitutional issue on its merits in Zobrest
is not an isolated example of a failure to adhere to the last resort rule. Early in the Court's history,
for example, the Court established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the
federal judiciary's power to review executive branch acts and Congressional legislation for con-
stitutionality. In Marbury, the Court reached the constitutional issue while declining to consider
alternative constructions of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which would have rendered
decision of the constitutional issue unnecessary. See CHEMEIuNSKY, supra note 38, at 14; ROnERT
L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REvIEW (1989); William W. Van Alystne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; see also BIcKEa., supra note 57, at 171-72
(citing Marbury as an example of a constitutional ruling when alternative, nonconstitutional
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to remand numerous cases because lower federal courts had failed to
consider nonconstitutional grounds of decision prior to ruling on
constitutional questions.129 The Court used this second approach of
vacating and remanding despite both the litigants' failure to press the
nonconstitutional issues and the inefficiency for the judiciary and the
litigants of such a process. The Court even vacated and remanded
when the lower courts had upheld the constitutionality of the chal-
lenged legislation. 30
The Court used this second approach in Escambia County v. McMil-
lan, after the district court found that the plaintiff had suffered dis-
crimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act.'3' The appellate court affirmed the district court solely on
the basis of its constitutional ruling. The parties did not brief or argue
the statutory question on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the
decision and remanded the matter to the appellate court, instructing
the court to consider first whether it could affirm the district court
based solely on the Voting Rights Act. 32 The Court, relying on the last
resort rule, has used this second approach in cases coming to it on
appeal from the highest courts of the states.133
grounds existed). First, the statute in Marbury might have been construed to apply only to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, because no other type ofjurisdiction was mentioned in the statute.
Second, the statute could have been construed as only granting the Court remedial power to
issue mandamus when the Court hasjurisdiction. The outcome ofthejudgmentin Marbury would
have been the same if the Court had ruled on either statutory basis, rather than reaching the
broader constitutional issues. Few question the broad impact of Marbury's constitutional rulings.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 10; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (12th ed. 1991);
cf James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992).
Marbury was decided prior to the articulation of the avoidance doctrine in Ashwander.
However, avoiding constitutional issues was not an entirely new idea. Justice Marshall, the author
of Marbury, enunciated a proposition similar to the avoidance doctrine in Ex Parte Randolph, 20
F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558), thirty years after Marbuy. Ld. at 254.
129See, e.g., Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1984) (vacating and remand-
ing where parties had not briefed and appellate court had not ruled on statutory issues); Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1983) (vacating and remanding for review of
statutory issue); Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1976) (vacating and remanding for
consideration of statutory questions not presented to lower court); Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-
Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136 (1946) (vacating and remanding for consideration of any
non-constitutional issues which might properly dispose of the appeal).
13 See, e.g., Alma Motor Co., 329 U.S. at 135-36.
131466 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1984).
132 Id. at 52.
133 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673 (1988)
(vacating and remanding to Oregon Supreme Court for further proceedings: "Because we are
uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon, it is not now appropriate
for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution."). But seeMichigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 (1983) ("We may review a state case decided on a federal ground
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In yet a third approach, when lower federal courts have failed to
sufficiently consider nonconstitutional bases for ajudgment, the Court
has sometimes considered those bases in order to avoid an unnecessary
constitutional rulingY" The Court in Siler (on which Brandeis relied
heavily for the last resort rule) followed this procedure. 135 In Siler, the
Court ultimately determined that it need not reach the constitutional
questions because it first determined that the Railroad Commission's
action exceeded its authority under a Kentucky statute.3 6 Notably, it
reached that conclusion even though the Kentucky courts had never
construed the statute. 37 The Zobrest Court also could have considered
the nonconstitutional claims itself and then reached the Establishment
Clause issue, if necessary, only in the last resort.
Fourth, a federal court can decline to follow the Siler procedure
to avoid the possibility of speculating on unclear state law issues.38 If
Pullman abstention is appropriate,3 9 federal courts require the litigants
to pursue unclear state law issues in state courts before seeking a
federal constitutional ruling. 40 When this abstention applies, plaintiffs
even if it is clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state court
could properly have relied.").
134 See, e.g,Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985);
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
lssSiler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). This procedure might be less
desirable than having the lower federal courts decide factual issues or initially construe the state
law.
16Id. at 192-93.
137Id at 194.
1s See Bandes, supra note 78, at 242-45. There is also the possibility that the Court would
be forced to reach the constitutional questions, and would have to send the state law issues back
to state court, under the rule established in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100-03 (1984). See Keith Werhan, Pullman Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment
onjudidalFederalism, 27 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 449, 486-87 (1986) (asserting that Pennhurst has
removed the discretionary aspect of Pullman, and absolutely requires bifurcation in cases situated
identically to Pullmam "pendent state claims against state officials in federal cases that present
alternative federal constitutional claims"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and
Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HAsT. CONST.
L.Q. 643 (1985). Justice Stevens, however, has claimed that Pennhurst did not qualify the last
resort rule, but held only that the Eleventh Amendment proscribed the award of injunctive relief
for violations of state law in certain cases, thereby removing the basis for avoiding decision of
federal constitutional questions in this class of cases. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693
n.5 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting).139 Pullman abstention is discussed infra Section W.E.1.
140Pullman abstention would not have been appropriate in Zobrest. Construction by the
Arizona courts of the Arizona Constitution would not have alleviated the need to consider
plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge. Because the IDEA imposes substantive requirements
as a matter of equal protection on all state schools, the IDEA preempts the Arizona constitution
to the extent it is inconsistent. See Salem College & Academy v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25,
29-30 (Or. 1985); see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (construing predecessor statute
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can later return to federal court if resolution of the federal issues
proves necessary.14' Similarly, if a state statute so provides, a federal
court can certify state law issues to the state's highest court.
When the Court in Zobrest found the last resort rule inapplicable,
it did not discuss its prior inconsistent implementation of the rule. The
Court rejected the rule without formulating "important reasons" for
reaching the Establishment Clause issue or explaining why the justifica-
tions for the rule could be disregarded.142 For example, the sensitive
social nature of the public funding of interpreters in parochial schools
might counsel hesitation in reaching the Establishment Clause.143
Although this Article argues in Section IV that the Court appro-
priately rejected the last resort rule in Zobrest because it did not have
to strike down the IDEA to reach its Establishment Clause ruling, the
Zobrest Court did not rely on established justifications for the avoidance
doctrine and last resort rule. Instead, it rejected the prudential rule in
light of the litigants' failure to press the nonconstitutional issues:
"Given this posture of the case, we think the prudential rule of avoiding
constitutional questions has no application. The fact that there may be
buried in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by
itself enough to invoke this rule."' The Court also supported its
rejection of the last resort rule with its technical practice of not nor-
mally considering issues which were not raised or considered by the
intermediate appellate court. 45 Of course, such a Supreme Court prac-
to IDEA); Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 778 F. Supp. 774, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (state
law not enforceable to extent state procedures require additional steps not required in IDEA).
In contrast, a state constitution can, in some areas, afford more protection than the federal
constitution and not be inconsistent with its provisions. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
141Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02.
142 The Court in Siler noted that constitutional questions are normally avoided absent "im-
portant reasons." 213 U.S. 175, 193. Formal adherence to a traditional maxim fails to explain
and justify sufficiently. As Vicki Jackson urged in another context, it is time for "reasoned and
honest disclosure of the basis for decision." Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 7 (1988); seeJulie Davies, Pullman and
Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of Federal and State Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1, 10 (1986).
14SAccording to Justice Frankfurter, the sensitive social nature of the racial integration of
sleeping cars in Pullmanjustified use of the last resort rule. In Section IV.E.1, infra, this Article
rejects that justification.
44 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466. In support of this assertion, the Court cited Board of Airport
Committees v. Jews forJesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572 (1987). In Jews forJesus, the Court was only
considering constitutional issues, however, and relied on a constitutional basis which the appellate
court had not considered, but which had been before the trial court. 482 U.S. at 572, 577. Thus,
the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions was not applicable.
145 Zobres4 113 S. Ct. at 2466.
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tice offers no guidance for the trial courts or intermediate appellate
courts in applying the last resort rule.46 Do lower courts have a duty
to determine whether nonconstitutional grounds for decision remain?
Or are they now free to ignore nonconstitutional grounds which are
not pressed by the parties?
The Court's ruling in Zobrest also underscores the malleability of
the last resort rule.147 Supreme Court Justices have recently charged
each other with manipulating tenets of the avoidance doctrine, includ-
ing the last resort rule, in their zeal to reach the merits of a particular
constitutional issue.14 But perhaps it is too simplistic to characterize the
Court's implementation of the last resort rule as convenient manipu-
lation. Bickel argues that, for Brandeis at least, techniques for avoiding
constitutional questions represented more than a technical bar raised
to avoid the merits if doing so would inure to one's favor. Bickel cites
Brandeis' unpublished opinion in Atherton Mills-in which he first set
out the avoidance doctrine-to support his argument that Brandeis
refused to reach the merits, and legitimate Congress's passage of the
progressive Child Labor Tax Act, in part, because of his "rigid insis-
tence" on jurisdictional principles such as the avoidance doctrine.149
146The avoidance doctrine applies to lower federal courts as well as the Supreme Court. See
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161 (1989); Escambia County v. McMil-
lan, 466 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1984); Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 137
(1946); see also Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
its duty to resolve state constitutional questions prior to federal ones); Seals v. Quarterly County
Court, 562 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1977).Justice Stevens notes that the Supreme Court's example
affects how lower federal courts exercise their powers of limited jurisdiction. Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 692 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
It is impossible to fully examine federal courts' application of the avoidance doctrine. Courts
do not always detail whether they have considered the dictate of the "last resort rule" and only
passed upon federal constitutional issues after exhausting all other bases or found the rule
inapplicable in a particular case. That, of course, renders my conclusions regarding historical use
of the doctrine incomplete. The delineation of the problem, however, may bring attention to this
failure and encourage a discussion about the doctrine's proper use.
147The inconsistent implementation of the last resort rule and the Court's failure to explain
its departures from the rule might lead some persons to conclude that the rule has been
manipulated in an unprincipled manner. For a similar discussion in context of the justiciability
doctrines, see Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 298.
148 See, e.g., Zobrest 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct.
1759, 1778 (1991) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
I49In 1922, fourteen years prior to his famous concurrence in Ashwander Justice Brandeis
first articulated the doctrine of avoiding unnecessary constitutional issues in a draft opinion of
the Atherton Mills v. Johnston decision-a draft which was never issued as the opinion of the
Court. Several years earlier, the Supreme Court had struck down a congressional attempt to
restrict child labor pursuant to the Commerce Clause in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (invalidating 1916 Congressional act, pursuant to Commerce Clause, excluding from
shipment in interstate commerce articles manufactured, in some circumstances, with child labor).
Justice Brandeis and three others dissented based upon the merits of congressional power to
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While Brandeis held out for his principles, the Court's membership
changed, positions shifted and this important piece of New Deal legis-
lation was declared unconstitutional. 150
Even if judicial manipulation is addressed, however, the Court's
approach to the last resort rule in Zobrest increased the opportunity
for manipulative use of the rule because it allows litigants to determine
when it is necessary to rule on a constitutional question. By not pressing
nonconstitutional claims on appeal, litigants can easily evade the last
resort rule and force courts to render constitutional rulings.15' This can
occur even when the facts of the case directly implicate regulations,
statutes or state law, as in Zobrest. As the dissenters argued, the litigants
got something resembling an advisory opinion: a declaration of their
constitutional rights without a complete resolution of the controversy. 152
As a result of the Court's ruling in Zobrest, the control over application
of the last resort rule has been transferred to litigants who seek an
expedient resolution of a constitutional issue which, for them, is pressing.
regulate child labor. SeeBicstn, supra note 7, at 1. Brandeis, a leader of the progressive movement
prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, supported efforts to abolish child labor, and he
vigorously dissented in Hammer, concluding that Congress had the power to regulate child labor
under the Commerce Clause. But Brandeis quietlyjoined the majority when the Court declared
unconstitutional another congressional attempt to regulate child labor under the taxing power
in The Child Labor Tax Case, in 1922. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); see Bicst,
supra note 7, at 2. On the same day, the Court dismissed the appeal in Atherton Mills-another
challenge to the Child Labor Tax Act-as moot because the child laborer had reached an age at
which the Act no longer applied to him. 259 U.S. at 15-16.
Bickel considered why Brandeis signed on with the majority in The Child Labor Tax Case
despite his vigorous dissent in Hammer, and argued that Brandeis' silence may have been due,
at least in part, to the position he took in the unpublished Atherton Mills draft that unnecessary
constitutional issues must be avoided. The unpublished draft opinion prepared by Brandeis
indicates that a majority of the Court would have agreed in 1919 to uphold the Act, but he refused
to overlook the jurisdictional difficulties and wrote a tentative opinion dismissing the suit for lack
of jurisdiction. The case was not moot at that time because the Act still applied to the child
laborer. The case was held over by the Court for several years and reargued after new members
had joined the Court. By the time it was decided, the Court had reached a different result on
the merits of the constitutional question, as evidenced by its decision in The Child Labor Tax Case
Thus, Bickel concluded that the delay-due in part to Brandeis' insistence on avoiding unnec-
essary constitutional questions-came at great cost. He argued that Brandeis may have lost on
the merits due to his "rigid insistence" on jurisdictional limitations, "thus demonstrating conclu-
sively that he was not indulging in the coinage of idle epigrams when he said: 'The most important
thing we do is not doing.'" BICKEL, supra note 7, at 17.
15 Bailey, 259 U.S. at 44.
151 This narrowing of the last resort rule is in sharp contrast to Justice Brandeis' broad
formulation of the avoidance doctrine. Indeed, he was extremely concerned with collusive suits,
where parties could manipulate proceedings to bring constitutional issues before the federal
courts. See supra Section II.
15 2 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, litigants enjoyed a great deal of control in determining
what claims to present to a court prior to Zobrest. If a litigant chooses
not to pursue her nonconstitutional claims in order to resolve a con-
stitutional issue, courts will often, as a matter of general practice, give
the litigant such autonomy as the "master of her complaint." This
practice obviously creates some tension with the dictates of the last
resort rule. Zobrest suggests that a lower federal court may refrain from
asking parties to brief nonconstitutional grounds for decision if the
parties only desire to press a constitutional claim. Litigants, however,
will have no incentive (and certainly no duty) to selflessly evaluate the
institutional concerns underlying the rule, including concerns of com-
ity and separation of powers, in order to determine whether noncon-
stitutional grounds merit consideration prior to a constitutional issue.
Thus, the Zobrest ruling deemphasizes important institutional justifica-
tions for the avoidance doctrine. It may also heighten opportunities
for manipulation of the judicial function by placing the responsibility
for avoiding constitutional questions through the last resort rule pri-
marily on litigants.
The flexibility offered by the Court's implementation of the last
resort rule carries with it costs in terms of stability, consistency, ef-
ficiency and respectability. The Court once defended the avoidance
doctrine by speculating that the premature and abstract decision-mak-
ing promoted by the opposite policy-a "policy of accelerated deci-
sion"--would render rights uncertain and insecure.1 53 It is not obvious,
however, that rights are more secure under a flexible system in which
the Court can determine the necessity of reaching a constitutional
issue in a particular case. In fact, a system in which federal courts reject
the last resort rule to render more constitutional decisions may better
secure federal rights. By addressing the Establishment Clause issue in
Zobrest the Court may have provided guidance on a pressing issue to
school systems nationwide. Alternatively, proliferation of federal con-
stitutional law may lead to nonuniformity in protection of federal
interests. The Supreme Court may better achieve uniformity in federal
law if it addresses constitutional issues but urges the lower federal
courts and state courts faced with federal constitutional questions to
use avoidance techniques.154
"0Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 572 (1947).154 The Court has emphasized the value of creating a uniform body of federal law in Murdoch
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 632 (1874), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039
(1983).
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Some might defend the inconsistent implementation of the last
resort rule, arguing that one benefit of a prudential doctrine is that it
offers the Court the ability to depart from its earlier applications of
the doctrine when the occasion demands. Such flexibility is desirable
if the Court seeks to test the waters of public reaction or to let a
problem simmer prior to issuing a constitutional ruling.155 If such
rulings are not rendered suddenly or haphazardly, reasoned Bickel, 156
the Court's decisions on important constitutional questions will likely
find widespread acceptance because the groundwork has been care-
fully laid and the Court's credibility is preserved. 15 7 Although I reject
such credibility concerns and other grounds as a basis for avoiding
constitutional questions, a flexible notion of the last resort rule is
suggested in order to address comity and separation of powers con-
cerns. A flexible notion of necessity is desirable to allow federal courts
to share their power of constitutional interpretation with the states and
other federal branches.
Thus, the last resort rule has not been implemented in a manner
which has diminished the potential for manipulation or provided an
effective rule of principle. The Zobrest Court erred in transferring to
litigants control over the necessity of reaching a constitutional issue.
The federal courts must become involved in elucidating when the
rule's justifications can be disregarded. In the next Section, this Article
posits a theory of applying the last resort rule which highlights its
federalism and separation of powers justifications.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE LAST RESORT RULE
The Supreme Court has provided six closely related justifications
for the general doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions, noting
their grounding in "the unique place and character . . .of judicial
review of governmental action for constitutionality."15 8 This Section
155 Bickel praised techniques such as the avoidance doctrine precisely because they allow the
Court to control the timing and circumstances of its ultimate constitutional pronouncements-
those decisions with the greatest impact. To borrow Bickel's phrase, the Court might "reflect out
loud... without as yet assuming responsibility" for the constitutional pronouncement. BIcEEt,
supra note 57, at 176.
156 Id at 240.157 Id.
158 RescueArmy, 331 U.S. at 571 (Court sets forth non-exhaustive list of doctrine's foundations
in case remanding California Supreme Court's decision for further proceedings); see Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693-94 n.6 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling Rescue Army list
one of the Court's most forceful expositions of avoidance doctrine).
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offers an analysis of these justifications as support for the last resort
rule.
A. A 'Delicate" and 'Final"Function
The Court has often called judicial review of legislative acts the
most important and delicate of its responsibilities.15 9 The Court's char-
acterization of judicial review of legislative acts as a "delica[te]" func-
tion, "particularly in view of possible consequences for others stem-
ming also from constitutional roots," fundamentally justifies the general
avoidance doctrine. 160 An evaluation of the force of this assertion as a
justification for avoiding constitutional questions must be linked to
evaluation of a second justification offered for the avoidance doctrine,
that such review is a "final" function. If the Court renders a final,
binding conclusion as to constitutional interpretation each time it
speaks on a constitutional issue, the arduous task of amending the
Constitution may provide the only counter to the Court's ruling.161 If,
however, the Court acts as more or less an equal participant with other
political actors in an ongoing dialogue, those other non-judicial actors
can reinterpret and reapply a constitutional provision.
The Court has declared itself the ultimate arbiter of the Constitu-
tion.1 62 Such broad statements raise the possibility of judicial review
undermining majority rule. The "countermajoritarian difficulty," posed
most notably by Bickel, asserts that "when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive,
it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people .... 1 63 Fed-
1
-59 See, e.g., Ashwanderv. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,345 (1936) (referencing other
cases to support the claim for the "great gravity and delicacy" of this function). While Brandeis
acknowledged the Court's "solemn dut[y]" to review the validity of legislative acts, he too cau-
tioned that such "power is the ultimate and supreme function of courts." BICKE, supra note 7,
at 7 (unpublished Atherton Mills draft quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S.
339, 345 (1892)); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 497, 509 (1961) (Brennan,J., concurring in
judgment) (until the true dispute regarding large scale birth-control clinics becomes ripe, "this
Court may not be compelled to exercise its most delicate power of constitutional adjudication").
160 Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 571. The Court has only discussed the six justifications in terms
referring to the general policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional questions rather
than in terms of the last resort rule.
161 Felix Frankfurter urged that President Roosevelt delay before proposing the drastic al-
ternative of a constitutional amendment to counter the Court's anti-New Deal rulings in the
1930's: "[H]e feared that an amendment to the Constitution would diminish the intrinsic char-
acter of a document that was intended to endure and that he profoundly believed had ample
resources within its original terms to meet the changing needs of successive generations." FRANK-
FuRTER DIAmEs, supra note 45, at 58.
'2See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958).
163BiCKEL, supra note 57, at 16-17.
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eral courts' encroachment on the popular will through invalidation of
legislative acts, in particular, disturbed Brandeis and Bickel. 64 Thus,
the perception of judicial review of legislative acts as a delicate and
final function is closely linked to the separation of powers principle,
discussed more fully below.
Even if one accepts the countermajoritarian difficulty,1 65 it only has
force to the extent that judicial decrees are viewed as final, ultimate
actions which cannot be overturned by other political actors. 66 In every
constitutional ruling the Court announces principles which are devel-
oped as they are applied in other cases. However, those principles are
not unassailably final. While a judicial decree may bind the parties to
a particular controversy, it may not necessarily represent the last word
on a constitutional issue. 67 As Bickel recognized, there is a critical
difference in the precedential nature of the "general law" created by
the Court in announcing a constitutional principle and the binding
effect of a judicial judgment on the parties to the controversy.168
Barry Friedman argues that judicial finality is "seriously over-
state[d]," citing examples of nonenforcement of judicial decisions
ranging from new legal challenges, to "footdragging," to outright de-
16Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 & n.12 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (relying on James B. Thayer's "clear mistake rule," which gives great deference to
legislative decisions absent unmistakable constitutional doubt); see BIcKEL, supra note 57, at 35.
Brandeis was angered by the federal courts' thwarting of popular will through invalidation of
progressive legislation. For background on the constitutional crisis surrounding the "old Court"
and the New Deal, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE LJ. 1013 (1984).
1 Friedman has assailed the countermajoritarian difficulty with great force. He argues that
courts are not "systematically less majoritarian than the political [branches]," and challenges the
premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty by concluding that courts are engaged in an
ongoing dialogue with the other branches and with the people. Through such dialogue, the
Constitution is interpreted and takes on meaning. Friedman, supra note 93 at 586, 657; seeJoHN
HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 62 (1980); Ackerman,
supra note 164, at 1014-15 (listing numerous commentators who have wrestled with the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty); Steven L. Winters, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 69 Thx. L. Rv. 1881, 1889-90 (1991) (judges are dependent on cultural understanding
which "shape and produce deeply majoritarian legal outcomes").
l6See Friedman, supra note 93, at 588 & n.55, 616.
1 67 Friedman calls this difference one between the particular "case" and the constitutional
"issue." Id. at 644. The Court's decrees on the issue are the "lawsaying" function of the decision-
making. 1d. at 646; see also Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1177 (1991).
Bickel also illuminates this difference between the case and the principle of constitutional law
necessary to a decision of the case. BICeL, supra note 57, at 203, 247-48. He defines the great
paradox thus: "the Court may only decide concrete cases and may not pronounce general
principles at large; but it may decide a constitutional issue only on the basis of general principle.
In the performance of this function ... the Court's 'mental vision embraces distance scenes.'"
Id. at 247 (quoting ChiefJustice Hughes).
'
68 BicKm, supra note 125, at 112.
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fiance. 69 Congress, for instance, can often respond to the Court's
constitutional decisions without amending the Constitution.170 For ex-
ample, in light of Zobrest, Congress could explicitly state that the IDEA
does not require the expenditure of public funds for interpreters in the
circumstances raised by the Zobrest child. Moreover, the Court has
revised its own constitutional positions over time,171 and challenges to
169 Friedman, supra note 93, at 644-52. For example, despite the Court's claim of finality, he
notes that the Court's word in Cooperv. Aaron was not the last word on segregation in Little Rock.
M. at 649. Friedman also cites continued prayer in public schools as an example of defiance. Id.
at 608; see BIcKEr, supra note 57, at 254-72 (discussing public and governmental reaction to
school desegregation decisions of the Court); Garrett Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpartick
and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 19 (1993) (describing Southern resistance to
integration of public schools after Brown v. Board of Education).
170 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (observing that the 1982 amendments
to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, were specifically intended to
repudiate the plurality opinion of City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); see also the
revised Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948 amendment providing exception to the
general prohibition in the Act, in reaction to the Court's decision in Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), which was intended to specifically override the case on its facts);
Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (affirming the validity of the McCarren Act of
1945 which had specifically been enacted to reverse the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters-Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), holding the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 applicable to insurance companies).
In the area of federal common law, the Court has noted that a right of action that isjudicially
implied from a statute may be trumped by explicit Congressional action in that area. See Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038-39 (1992) (asserting that Congress had the
opportunity to change implied remedies under Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88, after Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Court held that the procedural safeguards
against Congress's impairment of state sovereignty inhered in the structure and process of
congressional lawmaking itself. Thus, although the Court would not invalidate federal regulation
of state action under the commerce power, Congress was free to regulate itself.). But note that
Congress's ability to reverse Supreme Court decisions may be limited to issues of statutory
construction and may exclude "constitutional" determinations. Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
ion, 491 U.S. 164,172-73 (1989) (Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court stated: "Considerations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done."); see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits,
79 VA. L. REv. 1 (1993); Mary A. Schnabel, Comment, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act. A
Prison's Dilemma, 29 WiLAm rE L. Rxv. 323, 324 (1993) (noting that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, § 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), was introduced by Congress for the
specific purpose of overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which stated that a neutral law of general application burdening the
free exercise of religion need not be justified by a compelling state interest).
171 SeePlanned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2798 (1992) (describing the overruling
of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and the rejection of the constitutional ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); accord, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (explicitly overruling National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), and extending the application of federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause to state functions, regardless of the nature of those functions),
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constitutional rulings via new factual or legal arguments constantly
develop the principles of constitutional law.172
Bickel might agree, in large part, with such a responsive depiction
of our constitutional system. Even in his early work, he viewed our
constitutional system as resourceful. 173 Later, he explicitly emphasized
that a rule of constitutional law can only become effective if the people
and non-judicial political actors voluntarily comply with the Court's
constitutional rulings.' 4 Bruce Ackerman has argued, citing changes
in the New Deal era as an example, that the Court only engages in
fundamental constitutional lawmaking-essentially amending the Con-
stitution-with the agreement of Congress and when a national con-
sensus has been achieved. 75 This description resonates with Bickel's
perception of a continuing colloquy between the Court and nonjudi-
cial actors concerning constitutional principles:
The Court thus interacts with other institutions, with whom
it is engaged in an endlessly renewed educational conversa-
tion. It is a conversation that takes place when statutes are
construed, when jurisdiction is defined and perhaps declined
... and also when large "constitutional issues" are decided.
And it is a conversation, not a monologue. 176
172 Friedman, supra note 93, at 652 ("Over time, as a problem is lived with, the Court does
not work in isolation to divine the answer that is right It has the means to elicit partial answers
and reactions from the other institutions, and to try tentative answers itself"); MortonJ. Horwitz,
Foreword. The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 30, 52-53 & n.99 (1993) (describing Brandeis' progressive approach to precedent and
"changed circumstances" as grounded in pragmatist thinking); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights:
An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1876 (1987) ("Rights discourse reaches temporary
resting points from which new claims can be made.").
173 BicKEt, supra note 57, at 117 (finality of decrees is a "matter of degree") and 235 (finality
of consequences of constitutional determinations dependent on circumstances).
174 BIcKEL, supra note 125, at 111.
The general practice is to leave the enforcement ofjudge-made constitutional law
to private initiative, and to enforce it case by case, so that no penalties attach for
failure to abide by it before completion of a successful enforcement litigation. This
means quite literally that no one is under any legal obligation to carry out a rule
of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court until someone else has
conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree directing him to do so.
1d; see also id. at 101-02 (describing Abraham Lincoln's response to the Dred Scott decision as
viewing it binding only on the litigants).
15Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453, 459
(1989) (arguing that "the New Deal Democrats amended the Constitution by provoking a
complex constitutional dialogue between the voters at large and the institutions of the national
government"); Ackerman, supra note 164. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991).176 BIcKEL, supra note 125, at 111.
September 1994]
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The public response to the Court's pronouncements on constitu-
tional issues also affects the Court's ability to have the final say on
an issue.177
Thus, many would agree that our system is responsive and that the
finality of a federal court's constitutional pronouncements may be
highly contingent. But the finality concern underlying the avoidance
doctrine may be based on more than a claim that a constitutional
amendment might be necessary to respond to some rulings by the
Court. It might be grounded in the fear that judicial action forecloses
response by the other branches and the people themselves-or at least
makes such response less likely and less authoritative. At an extreme,
the concern might be put thus: "[The] tendency of a common and
easy resort to this great function [ofjudicial review] ... is to dwarf the
political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility."178
It is difficult to gauge the extent that judicial activity dwarfs the
non-judicial political capacity. The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, for
example, might be characterized as ruling more broadly than neces-
sary on a constitutional issue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has argued
that "[a] less encompassing Roe... might have served to reduce rather
than to fuel controversy." 179 On the other hand, the Court's decision
may have stirred up a sense of moral responsibility and encouraged
more political participation among certain groups. For example, op-
ponents of Roe have unsuccessfully proposed legislation in Congress to
remove federal courts'jurisdiction over abortion cases. Such a reaction
177For a wonderful description of constitutional law as a dialogue involving many actors,
replete with specific examples, see Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988); see also
BlcKEL, supranote 57, at 235 (recognizing the resourcefulness of non-Court actors in our system
to control the consequences of some constitutional decisions); PHILIP BOBBiTr, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE 5 (1982) (many actors interpret the Constitution); Friedman, supra note 93, at 682 ("The
problem with the countermajoritarian difficulty is that it overstates the role of courts and thus
understates society's responsibility."); Frohnmayer, supra note 66 (urging other branches, par-
ticularly the legislature, to accept their responsibility in a system of shared powers); Van Alystyne,
supra note 128 (asserting that the Supreme Court is not the only expositor of Constitution).
178 BicKEL, supra note 57, at 147 (quotingJ.B. THAYERJOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901)).
"19Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in ajudicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1199 (1992).
For another critique of Roe reflecting another aspect of the avoidance principle, see Richard A.
Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SociETY 29 (Michael
Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
On a pragmatic view, the error of Roe v. Wadeis not that it read the Constitution wrong, but
that it prematurely nationalized an issue best left to simmer longer at the state and local level
until a consensus based on experience with a variety of approaches to abortion emerged. Posner,
supra, at 42.
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may be desirable, even if it brings with it some hostility toward the
Court.
As long as other actors are able to respond to federal courts'
decrees, including those of the Supreme Court, the courts' decrees are
less final. If non-judicial actors (at the state and federal levels) possess
the ability to participate in the constitutional dialogue, but choose not
to, judicial decision making is, likewise, a less delicate function. They
do not foreclose the ability of others to act. At times, judicial decisions
might even spur responsive constitutional development. A Supreme
Court decision about the meaning of a right guarantee is not neces-
sarily "final" with respect to citizens of states with the same or similar
state guarantees if the decision fuels responsive activity at a state con-
stitutional level. 80
Some might respond that stability in the law is undermined if our
system is too responsive, if the Supreme Court's constitutional deci-
sions are not viewed as sufficiently final. But strict adherence to the
last resort rule due to finality concerns would not greatly promote
stability in constitutional law. Constitutional interpretation is not a
fixed and certain enterprise. Constitutional law is constantly develop-
ing: being reinterpreted by lower federal courts and state courts as new
factual challenges are presented, being developed as legislatures enact
slightly different laws and as executive officials promulgate new regu-
lations. Moreover, the Supreme Court, with its discretionary certiorari
policies, faces only a small portion of the constitutional questions
raised in litigation today. The federal circuits may have differing con-
stitutional pronouncements on the same issue for a considerable pe-
riod of time.'"' Stability-in terms of a uniform body of law-is not
today, and perhaps has never been, a prominent feature of federal
constitutional law. Ifjudicial pronouncements of constitutional princi-
ples are viewed as helpful in guiding development of constitutional law,
strict adherence by the lower federal courts to the last resort rule
should be rejected. 182
18 0The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a state may "adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967)).
181 Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HAsv. L. Rv.
1147, 1161 (1993) ("[D]ifferent courts can and will reach different conclusions about the mean-
ing of such constitutional values. Agreement is no more to be expected of courts than of
individuals.").
'
82Today, with the Supreme Court's discretionary certiorari policies, the last resort rule may
most often be of concern in the lower federal courts.
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Thus, two important justifications for the avoidance doctrine in
general, and the last resort rule in particular-the delicacy and finality
of the function ofjudicial review-have less force in our dialogic system.
One of the most serious concerns raised by the first two justifications
for the last resort rule is that it might take a constitutional amendment
to alter a court's pronouncement on a constitutional issue. If the
court's ruling, however, does not foreclose participation in the consti-
tutional dialogue by non-judicial actors, the court should disregard the
last resort rule. 183 For example, if a court recognizes that a right also
exists in a state constitution, the court should be less concerned with
construing the parallel federal provision.
The second serious concern raised by these two justifications is
the idea that judicial review is more dangerous or invasive when it
involves invalidating legislative acts, and that courts, therefore, should
exercise particular caution when judicial review may involve invalidat-
ing a legislative act. This distinction is discussed more fully with the
separation of powers concern below.
B. The Judiciary's Limitations
The avoidance doctrine is also premised on "the inherent limita-
tions of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative
character and limited resources of enforcement."18 4 Additionally, fed-
eral courts are vulnerable to the extent their jurisdiction and the work
of their judges are subject to control by the other branches. 185 Propo-
nents of avoidance techniques such as the last resort rule believe that
the federal judiciary must exercise its powers cautiously to conserve
the fragile credibility of the least dangerous branch.86 Brandeis recog-
183This suggestion is similar to the one offered by Lea Brilmayer in her classic article on
justiciability stating that cases which will have less precedential effect should give judges less pause
in implementing the case or controversy requirement. See Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 316-17.
184Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
l85Avoiding constitutional adjudication, in which the Court might irritate Congress by
striking down statutes, protects the Court from congressional retaliation in the form of frequently
proposed limits on federal jurisdiction. Congress can contribute to increased federal judicial
workload, attempt to "pack" the court, and, in general, make life miserable for federal judges.
See CHEMEPINSKY, supra note 38, at 146-51; FRANKFURTER DARIES, supra note 45, at 86 Uusticc
Jackson noted that the Court "is subject to being stripped of jurisdiction or smothered with
additional justices"); Louis L.Jaffee, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. Ray. 940 (1955) (interview
with Justice Jackson including comments on Court's vulnerability).
18 BICKEL, supranote 57, at 201-68; CHEMERINSKY, supranote 38, at39 (influential scholars
contend that federal courts generally depend on the other branches to voluntarily comply with
judicial orders and that such acquiescence depends on thejudiciary's credibility") (citing BICKE.L,
supra note 57 and JEssEE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
55-59 (1980)); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Legitimay ofjudicial Review in Individual Rights
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nized the "vehement" popular protest against the judiciary's review of
congressional acts. 187 In a 1922 letter to Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis
warned that to protect itself from prevailing discontent, the Supreme
Court must exercise restraint by, among other things, "refusing to pass
on constitutional questions if the case can be disposed of on any
other."188 Scholarship and public opinion of the 1920's and 1930's
reflected the prevailing discontent with many Court decisions, and
Brandeis believed that only with the strictest self-restraint could the
Court avoid aggravating the discontent and undermining the legiti-
macy of the federal courts.189
Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REv. 587, 588 (1985). One
of the basic underpinnings ofjudicial restraint is the concept of husbanding judicial resources
to preserve the federal judiciary's credibility: "The indispensability of husbanding what powers
one had, of keeping within bounds if action is not to outrun wisdom." Freund, Introduction to
BicKEL, supra note 7, at xvii.
18 7 In the draft opinion of Atherton Mills, Justice Brandeis wrote:
For nearly a century and a quarter Federal courts, as an incident to deciding cases
rightfully before them, have necessarily exercised at times the solemn duty of
declaring acts of Congress void. But the long continued, uninterrupted exercise of
this power has not sufficed to silence the doubt originally expressed whether the
framers of the Constitution intended to confer it. On the contrary, the popular
protest against its exercise has never been as vehement, nor has it ever secured the
support of so many political thinkers and writers, as in the last decade. At a time
like the present, when the fundamental principles upon which our institutions rest
are being seriously questioned, those who have faith in their wisdom and desire to
preserve them unimpaired, can best uphold the Constitution by careful observance
of the limitations which it imposes.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting draft opinion).
188Justice Brandeis lists four doctrines ofjudicial restraint:
1. In refraining from all constitutional dicta.
2. In refusing to consider a constitutional question except in "cases" or "contro-
versies'---"initiated according to the regular course ofjudicial procedure."
3. In refusing to pass on constitutional questions if the case can be disposed of on
any other.
4. In refusing to hold an act void unless it clearly exceeds the powers conferred,
etc.
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 19, 1922), reprinted in BRANDEIS
L=ERs, supra note 87, at 110; see BICKEL, supra note 57, at 112 (for Brandeis, the "mediating
techniques of not doing" were the most important thing the Court did).
18 9BICKEL, supra note 57, at 45-46 (citing the turbulent reaction to Court decisions in the
1930's); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 135. In response to the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20 (1922) (discussed supra note 149), Senator Robert M. La Follette, in a speech to the American
Federation of Labor on June 14, 1922, "proposed a constitutional amendment that would have
prohibited lower federal courts from invalidating legislation and would have allowed the Congress
to override a Court decree regarding specific legislation simply by repassing the measure."
BRANDEIS LETrERS, supra note 87, at 104 n.5. The desire to restrain the Court was echoed by
academics such as Raymond Buell who recommended that any decision by the Court to invalidate
legislation should be made by a two-thirds majority. Raymond Leslie Buell, Reforming the Supreme
Court, 114 NATION 714 (June 14, 1992).
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In 1947, evaluating the avoidance doctrine generally, the Supreme
Court speculated that to pursue another policy-a policy of "acceler-
ated decision"-"might have put an end to, or seriously impaired, the
distinctively American institution of judicial review."190 The Court con-
tinued: "It is not without significance for the [avoidance] policy's
validity that the periods when the power [ofjudicial review of legislative
acts] has been exercised most readily and broadly have been the ones
in which this Court and the institution of judicial review had their
stormiest experiences." 191
Ackerman notes that Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty "re-
calls the Old Court's long, and ultimately futile, judicial struggle against
the New Deal."192 By using the last resort rule frequently, the Court can
live with a constitutional problem and let a solution simmer until
widespread acceptance is at hand.19 3 Bickel argued that the avoidance
doctrine, by allowing the judiciary to render unpopular decisions cau-
tiously, rather than suddenly or haphazardly, preserves judicial credi-
bility and increases public acceptance of Court decisions.194 The last
resort rule allows judges to determine when widespread acceptance is
at hand or when more simmering is necessary.
But even if a judge is correct in her assessment that the public is
not ready to accept an unpopular opinion, how long can a court
justifiably avoid a constitutional problem by use of the last resort rule?
Some scholars argue that preserving credibility or political capital
should not concern the judicial branch.195 Arguably, in addition to the
190Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 572 (1947).
191 d. at 572 n.38.
192Ackerman, supra note 164, at 1015. In 1935, the Court "invalidated the National Recovery
Act, plunging the nation into a major constitutional confrontation."Joseph Lash, Introduction to
FRANrFORTER DIARiEs, supra note 45, at 57. Frankfurter advised Franklin Delano Roosevelt to
postpone directly attacking the Court on that decision until "other issues 'accumulate popular
grievances against the Court.'" Id.
193 Through technical devices such as the avoidance doctrine, the Court could control when
it interprets the Constitution in order to ensure a receptive reaction from the public and
"majoritarian" branches and afford "the necessary leeway to expedient accommodation." BICKEL,
supra note 57, at 111-98 ('The Passive Virtues" chapter). The means for accomplishing these
goals were a variety of doctrines Bickel described as "the passive virtues." Id.; see also Friedman,
supra note 93, at 681.
194 BIcKEL, supra note 57, at 240; BICKEL, supra note 125, at 26, 106, 110 and 120. Some who
call themselves neopragmatists might agree that precipitate social change is dangerous. See, e.g.,
Posner, supra note 106, at 41-42.
195 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 133-38; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 39 n.5 ("con-
serving judicial credibility should not be a primary objective in constitutional interpretation");
LAWRENCE TRIaE, AmEmicAN CONSTITUTrONAL LAW viii (2d ed. 1987); Lino A. Graglia, Do Judges
Have a Policy-Making Role in the American System of Government?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pot'v
119, 129 (1994).
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duty to hear cases properly before them, federal courts have a duty to
render an unpopular decision when adherence to the Constitution so
demands.195 The last resort rule, however, does not require a court to
refuse to decide a case; it requires a refusal to resolve the case on a
constitutional ground. As argued when considering the separation
principle below, decisions of certain issues, particularly those involving
non-majoritarian rights, may never find widespread acceptance. In fact,
decision by a federal court on constitutional grounds may be necessary
to foster acceptance of such rights. For example, unanimous constitu-
tional interpretation by the Supreme Court and respectful tones in
opinions are two methods of addressing viability concerns.1 97 In any
event, the dilemma of determining the appropriate moment for avoid-
ing constitutional decision cannot always depend on waiting for a right
time or receptive audience.
Even the initial assertion that judicial credibility is fragile is not
without dissenters. Two hundred years of history have disproved "pre-
dictions of doom-that society could not accept a government where
judges had discretion to choose constitutional values," including values
involved in sensitive social issues such as desegregation and abortion.198
Rather than fragile, judicial credibility can just as persuasively be char-
acterized as robust, and the Supreme Court arguably has reached a
historically unparalleled level of stature and importance.199 Of course,
others might counter that the robust state of the Court's credibility
derives from past prudence.
At a minimum, support for the last resort rule based on the
judiciary's limited credibility should be questioned. Although it is
196See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERuOUSLY 131-49 (1977) (judicial review
vindicates the rights of unpopular minorities). While recognizing thatjusticiability doctrines serve
important goals, such as addressing separation of powers concerns, conservingjudicial resources,
improving decisionmaking and promoting fairness, costs are attached. "[I]t is at least equally
important that the doctrines not prevent the federal courts from performing their essential
function in upholding the Constitution of the United States and preventing and redressing
violations of federal laws." CHEMEINSKY, supra note 38, at 40.
197 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 179.
198 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 133-34. Chemerinsky contends that the legitimacy argu-
ment "assumes that the people believe judicial decisions are entirely formalistic, with the Court
reasoning from clear constitutional premises to determinate conclusions." He concludes that
society is sophisticated enough to realize, particularly in light of controversial decisions such as
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that the
Constitution is not merely being mechanically applied by the courts.
199CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44; id. at 135 (discussing Roosevelt Court packing plan);John
J. Gibbons, Keynote Address, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 260, 271 (1981) (-The historical record suggests
... judicial review is in fact quite robust."); Friedman, supra note 93, at 624-25 (citing, among
other indicators, public interest in Court decisions and its makeup).
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difficult to gauge the judiciary's credibility and viability empirically,
historical developments indicate that we do not need to take as sacred
assertions that the judiciary's credibility and viability are fragile.200 No
link between avoiding decision of constitutional questions and judicial
fragility has been proven. For example, imagine the reaction if Brown
had been decided on a plausible non-constitutional ground. Suppose
a federal funding statute could have been interpreted to require any
state accepting federal aid to end public school segregation. If the
Court required integration in the statutory rather than constitutional
bases, it seems unlikely that the public reaction would focus on the
ground for decision rather than the bottom-line integration outcome.
C. The Importance of Constitutional Adjudication
Anotherjustification for the avoidance doctrine is the "paramount
importance of constitutional adjudication in our system." 20 1 This justifica-
tion overlaps to some extent with the delicate and final nature of the
constitutional function, discussed above. But it also implicates the role
of constitutional rights.
The Court sometimes claims that the ability to declare constitu-
tional rights is the most important power the federal judiciary wields.
But many individual rights depend on administrative and statutory
claims. Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that not "every constitutional
claim is ipso facto more worthy, and every statutory claim less worthy,
of judicial review."202 A decision by a court clarifying a statutory or
procedural entitlement to relief may have a tremendous effect on a
great number of individuals, or on the workings of an administrative
agency2
03
Skeptics might counter, however, that judicial interpretation of
constitutional provisions is more critical because Congress can correct
or more easily alter a court's nonconstitutional ruling. For example, if
the Court implies a private cause of action for damages in a congres-
20 0 CHFManJNSKY, supra note 44, at 134.
201 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
202 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (employee of Central Intelli-
gence Agency sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act of his dismissal alleging
constitutional and other violations; Court concluded that Congress did not intend to preclude
judicial review of colorable constitutional challenges).Justice Scalia hypothesizes: "A citizen would
much rather have his statutory entitlement correctly acknowledged after a constitutionally inade-
quate hearing, than have it incorrectly denied after a proceeding that fulfills all the requirements
of the Due Process Clause." Id at 618.203 The litigation involving the Northern Spotted Owl demonstrates this effect. See, e.g.,
Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy, 998 E2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
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sional statute, Congress can clarify or revise the statute to preclude such
relief. Congress may need to address a constitutional ruling through
the more cumbersome "supermajoritarian" process of amending the
Constitution. However, as noted earlier, Congress and other non-judi-
cial actors in our system have numerous ways to respond to judicial
decisions: to revise legislation, or to distinguish or develop the Court's
pronouncements on constitutional issues through new legal challenges.
Similarly, rights claims can sometimes more successfully be litigated
under state constitutions.
Even if all agree that deciding constitutional issues is the most
important function of federal courts, or at least one of the primary
functions of federal courts,204 it does not follow that the courts should
avoid such a responsibility. On the contrary, the importance of such
issues (considered alone) might dictate a heightened duty to decide
constitutional questions. 20 5
Thus, I reject application of the last resort rule based on concerns
about the federal courts' credibility and the delicate, final and impor-
tant nature of constitutional adjudication. Even if those justifications
persuaded previously, they have less force in our modern constitutional
system. Instead, the final two justifications for the last resort rule, dis-
cussed next, counsel in favor of retaining a flexible version of the rule.
D. Separation of Powers and Respect for Other Branches
The most forceful justifications for the avoidance doctrine are "the
necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each [branch]
to keep within its power, including the courts"206 and "the considera-
tion due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power
204 See Bandes, supra note 78, at 319 ("the most important goal of Article Ill is to preserve
the Court as primary guardian of the Constitution"); see also MARTIN H. REDiss, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TSNSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OFJUDICIAL POWER 1 & n.2 (1980); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreward: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 42-44 (1979);
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1265
(1961).
20 5Justice Douglas, dissenting from the Court's refusal to hold the dispute regarding Con-
necticut's law banning contraceptive use ripe in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) argued:
"A sick wife, a concerned husband, a conscientious doctor seek a dignified, discrete [sic], orderly
answer to the critical problem confronting them.... They are entitled to an answer to their
predicament here and now." Bici.ra, supra note 57, at 127 (citing Solicitor General James M.
Beck's opinion that it was "a citizen's right to have any constitutional issue ultimately decided by
the Supreme Court, 'as the final conscience of the Nation in such matters.'"). Scholars have
debated extensively the problem ofreconciling the duty of federal courts to decide cases properly
before them with techniques such as the abstention doctrines. The commentators cited supra at
note 204 discuss this issue, as does Professor Bandes, cited supra at note 78.
206 Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 571. Separation of powers entails separate institutions sharing
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concerning the scope of their authority."20 7 These justifications are
grounded in the separation of powers principle in a constitutional and
prudential sense. This analysis assumes that the federal courts will
continue to adhere to established constraints flowing from the "case
and controversy" requirement, including the justiciability and political
question doctrines. The last resort rule is an additional, prudential
restraint influenced by both the separation principle and the pruden-
tial matter of appropriate respect for the other federal branches.
Concerns based on the separation principle and comity are com-
plex and elusive to apply in a manner that is not purely reflexive. The
remainder of this Article offers a formulation for applying the rule
which takes into account these tensions. Retaining a prudential version
of the last resort rule is necessary to afford respect for the states and
other branches, and in order to share with them the power of consti-
tutional interpretation and development.
As Brandeis acknowledged, ajudge must "shrink" from exercising
such power only where she can do so in a manner consistent with her
duty and official oath. A federal judge's oath requires her to uphold
the Constitution, and to decide cases properly before her, and over
which Congress has properly given the courtjurisdiction.208 In addition
to the avoidance doctrine, certain abstention doctrines dictate that
deferral or avoidance of a decision is sometimes appropriate even
when a federal court has jurisdiction over a case. Some scholars argue
that the duty to hear cases properly before the federal courts is de-
feated by such doctrines, and that declining to exercise jurisdiction
given by Congress itself violates the separation of powers doctrine.
209
necessarily overlapping powers. See Bicicra, supra note 57, at 261 (governmental functions
"cannot and need not be rigidly compartmentalized"); RIcHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER, THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960); Frohnmayer, supra note 60.
207 Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 571.
208 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821) (the federaljudiciary has "no more
right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the [C]onstitution."). But see David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985) (criticizing "reflexive invocation" of the
dictum in Cohens). The Court has recognized that the abstention doctrines, including Pullman
abstention-an important application of the last resort rule-are "an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." County
ofAlleghenyv. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959); see also Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1959) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (Court disregarded
"imperative duty... [imposed by Congress under jurisdiction statutes] ... to render prompt
justice").
209 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judidal Function,
94 YALE LJ. 71 (1984); cf. Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA.
L. REv. 1097 (1985).
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The last resort rule, however, does not require a court to refuse
to hear a case; it requires a refusal to resolve the case on a constitu-
tional ground. Thus, the question becomes whether resolving a case
on a constitutional ground when nonconstitutional grounds are avail-
able offends the separation of powers principle or affords insufficient
respect to other branches. Some might argue that a court, in exercising
the federal judicial power to strike down (or even sustain) statutes on
a constitutional ground, impermissibly encroaches on the legislature.
In this view, any expansion of the judicial power implies less power for
the other branches.2 10
I shall use the early Bickel approach to outline an argument for
a more or less absolute last resort rule,21' and then examine how
Brandeis appeared to view constraints imposed by the separation prin-
ciple and respect for other authorities. Finally, I shall address the
argument that declining to resolve the case on a constitutional ground
through application of the last resort rule violates the separation of
powers principle in that a court fails to exercise its rightful power and
fulfill its duty whenever it avoids resolving a constitutional question.
Bickel argued that even when the Court construes the Constitu-
tion to legitimate legislative action, it affects the functions of the other
branches. As an example, Bickel cited the controversy brewing in the
1950's and 1960's over the constitutionality of federal aid to parochial
210 Expansion of access to judicial determination through construction ofjusticiability and
jurisdictional doctrines is frequently perceived as a shift of power. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
130 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (emphasis added):
It seems to me clear that public actions, whatever the constitutional provisions on
which they are premised, may involve important hazards for the continued effec-
tiveness of the federal judiciary. Although I believe such actions to be within the
jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article I of the Constitution, there
surely can be little doubt that they strain the judicial function and press to the limit
judicial authority. There is every reason to fear that unrestricted public actions
mightwell alter the allocation of authority among the three branches of the Federal
Government.
U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted):
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion ofjudicial
power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen
standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with
a shift away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated
and essentially head-on confrontations between the lifetenured branch and the
representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to
either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our
power to negative the actions of the other branches.
2111 am taking some liberty in characterizing the views of Bickel, since he did not address
the last resort rule in depth.
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schools. If the Court were to intervene and declare such aid constitu-
tional, he argued, the outcome of the political controversy surely would
be affected or even determined by the Court's decision.212 Of course,
the Court did so intervene when it refused to apply the last resort rule
in Zobrest. To what extent the Court's ruling will affect or determine
the outcome of the political controversy remains to be seen. But Bickel
did not conclude that such intervention would clearly violate the
separation of powers principle. Instead, he endorsed self-imposed re-
straints, such as the last resort rule, as a virtue. When the Court clearly
indicates that it will not reach the constitutionality of the legislative
action, the other branches can operate relatively free from counterma-
joritarian influence.2 13 Bickel's view, based primarily on the prudential
justification of affording the other branches due respect, supports a
fairly literal or absolute last resort rule in order to avoid potential
undue intervention, even by sustaining legislative action on constitu-
tional grounds.
Despite his broad language in Ashwander about avoiding constitu-
tional questions and broad language elsewhere concerning judicial
restraint ('The most important thing we do is in 'not doing"'), 214
Brandeis appeared to take a less than expansive stance in applying the
last resort rule. Brandeis appeared most concerned about "encroach-
ment" on the functions of other branches, and thus urged caution
most strenuously when courts reviewed the constitutionality of congres-
sional acts. 215 Two years after Ashwander, Brandeis ignored the last
resort rule in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins. 16 The Court issued a
broad constitutional pronouncement, even though it could have relied
solely on nonconstitutional grounds-interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act-to reach its determination that federal courts should
apply state common law in diversity cases.2 17 Brandeis wrote:
212 BsKa, supra note 57, at 130, 203 (Court's announcement of constitutional principle
influences public policy as well as affects future cases).
213 Id. at 70.
2 14 BICKEL, supra note 7, at 17.
215 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (focusing on "power to
declare a legislative enactment void"); see id. at 355 ("'One branch of the government cannot
encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no
small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.'") (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700, 718 (1878)); BtcKEL, supra note 7, at4 (Brandeis uses the same quote in his first elucidation
of the avoidance doctrine in the unpublished Atherton Mills opinion).
216304 U.S. 64 (1938).
217 See id. at 90 (Reed, J., concurring, except to extent to which majority relied on "uncon-
stitutionality of the 'course pursued' by the federal courts" under Swift v. 7yson). According to
Justice Reed, "It seems preferable to overturn an established construction of an act of Congress,
rather than, in the circumstances of this case, to interpret the Constitution." Id at 92; see John
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Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes
said, "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts
of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." In dis-
approving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional § 34
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other act of
Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine
this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
states.
218
Brandeis did not provide any elucidation as to why he found the
last resort rule inapplicable. He reached the constitutional ground
even though the parties had not briefed or argued it. He apparently
reasoned that the concern for federalism was not implicated by over-
ruling Swift. Brandeis expressly noted that the constitutional ruling in
Erie was necessary to counter past invasion of states' rights by the
federal courts. Thus, the Court acted to afford more rights to the states,
and the last resort rule gave the Court no cause to hesitate.2 19 Further,
Brandeis may have reasoned that refusal to apply the last resort rule
did not offend the separation of powers principle because the Court
did not hold a legislative act unconstitutional. Instead, separation of
powers may have counselled Eids limitation on federal court power
to displace state law absent Congressional authorization for a different
approach. 2 0 The Court acted to affirm, rather than restrict, the power
of Congress and the last resort rule gave the Court no cause to hesitate.
Similarly, Brandeis might approve of the Court's refusal to apply
the last resort rule in Zobrest because the Court did not strike down
legislation in issuing its ruling. Yet the Court did not compel funding
for deaf interpreters and other assistants for disabled children in pri-
vate schools under the Free Exercise Clause. Instead of squelching the
activities of the states or other federal branches, the Court arguably
afforded political decisionmakers room for response. Other actors can
now decide whether to fund such assistance without fear of violating
the Establishment Clause.
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Hlv. L. Rv. 693 (1974); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise
of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964) (rejecting arguments
that the constitutional discussion in Eriewas dictum).
218Eriie 304 U.S. at 79-80.
219 See PErR W. Low & JOHN CALvrN JFFRiEs, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 278-79 (2d ed. 1989).
220 See PaulJ. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1682,
1683-86 (1974); Monaghan, supra note 78.
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I read Brandeis' refusal to apply the last resort rule in Erie to
support a more limited formulation of the last resort rule than his
broad language in Ashwander suggests. Brandeis' focus on the power
to void legislative enactments in Ashwander, and the grounding of the
Ashwander decision in the context of the struggle between the old
Court and other branches of government over the New Deal, buttress
my limited formulation. The last resort rule should aim primarily to
avoid a direct repudiation of legislative or executive action. A court
does not encroach impermissibly on the co-equal branches when it
voids the action of a branch on the basis of a constitutional challenge.
It should proceed with prudence, however, before doing so when
nonconstitutional grounds for decision remain.
Admittedly, the concern for regarding separation of powers may
vary with the context in which a court would reach a judgment on a
constitutional ground. As noted above, in Eie the concerns were less-
ened because the Court's constitutional ruling invalidated only a judge-
made doctrine and thus did not invade the territory of another branch
or of the states. In a second category, a constitutional decision uphold-
ing, rather than invalidating legislative or executive action on consti-
tutional grounds, is less likely to offend other political branches. Third,
a decision on constitutional grounds might sometimes invalidate po-
tential legislative or executive acts, foreclosing some power which had
not yet been exercised by those actors. For example, if the Court in
Zobrest had found that the Establishment Clause bars the public fund-
ing of interpreters in public schools, a future statute providing funding
in those circumstances would be foreclosed. While separation of pow-
ers is less implicated in the Eie context, it is more difficult to deter-
mine whether deference always warrants avoiding the constitutional
ground in the latter examples.
This analysis of Brandeis' use of the last resort rule allows courts
to mediate between Bickel's overly cautious approach and a theory
which posits a duty to address constitutional questions whenever pre-
sented. At the other end of the spectrum from Bickel, one could argue
that declining to resolve a case on a constitutional ground violates the
separation of powers principle. For example, Friedman asserts that the
"entire concern with constraining judges" rests on an inaccurate de-
scription of our constitutional system framed by the countermajori-
tarian difficulty. 21 A normative theory of the role of the federal courts
221 Friedman, supra note 93, at 638. According to Friedman, "the erroneous assumption,
which pervades the countermajoritarian difficulty, is that such a thing as 'majority will' exists to
legitimate decisions of the 'representative' branches." Id. Friedman recognizes that concerns
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in the dialogic system posed by Friedman might abjure the last resort
rule. 222 Alternatively, such a theory might posit that judges have a duty
to fully engage in the constitutional dialogue and that the last resort
rule erects an illegitimate barrier to addressing constitutional ques-
tions.
223
Brandeis might respond that his hesitation to void legislative en-
actments was based in part on his awareness of the fallibility of
judges:22 4
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious
of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from exercis-
ing in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility.
25
Those who posit a duty to address constitutional issues would re-
spond that the last resort rule fails to correct the fallibility problem.
By not undertaking the task of constitutional interpretation, the
Court merely postpones its own task until a later case, or allows
other fallible (and more politically vulnerable) actors to undertake,
or refuse to undertake, that task.226 As Bickel noted, even in exercis-
ing its passive virtues of not doing, the Court nevertheless exercises
thejudicial power, which has its own consequences: the Court "may
be permitting its previous judgments to continue to have a certain
effect, or it may be allowing lower federal or state courts to engage
in constitutional experimentation." 227
about constraining the judiciary underlie the countermajoritarian difficulty, but asserts that
sufficient constraints on judges are contained within the political surroundings in which the
judiciary operates-within "our dialogic system." ML at 671-80.
222 Friedman maintains that his account is merely descriptive, not normative. He notes that
the idea of dialogue encourages normative theories for use in the dialogue. 1d. at 680.
223 See generally Bandes, supra note 78 (arguing that the role of the federal courts is to
interpret and enforce federal law, particularly the Constitution).
224 Paul Freund cites Brandeis' awareness of "the limits of human capacity, the fallibility of
judgment" in laying the foundations for his cautious restraint in Freund, Introduction to BcxEzr,
supra note 7, at xvii; see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
Onejustification for judicial restraint is to check the tendency of"inherent[ly] self-aggrandizing"
human beings to act in matters requiring infallibility. Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist No. 86: On
Relations Between theJudidary and Congress, inJUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL
COMITY, supra note 38, at 25.225Ashwander 297 U.S. at 345 (citation omitted).
226BIcyt, supra note 57, at 207. Bickel says that the Court "checks; it legitimates; or it does
neither." Id. at 200.
227Id. at 200-01. See generally Gunther, supra note 36.
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I reject the argument that the federal courts offend the separation
principle whenever they fail to address a constitutional issue. The
primary constitutional responsibility of the federal courts is to resolve
cases, not to reach constitutional issues. Avoiding a constitutional issue
through use of the last resort rule, however, can undermine the courts'
duty to be a counterweight to the more political branches when the
Constitution so demands. As in Pullman, the Court's postponement of
decision allows the allegedly unconstitutional conduct to continue
until checked. The last resort rule can thus function as an improper
abdication of federal courts' duty to act as a countermajoritarian force.
The function of courts generally, and federal courts in particular under
this view, is to be unpopular, to issue countermajoritarian decisions, to
do what the law requires despite political pressure.28 Although the
majoritarian branches also have a duty to uphold the Constitution,229
the federal courts, because they are more insulated from political
pressure, are particularly designed for protecting the rights of minori-
ties.u 0
A theory of appropriate application of a flexible last resort rule
implicates value choices. Separation of powers and due respect for the
other federal branches support use of the last resort rule primarily to
avoid striking down legislation (and, perhaps more prevalent today,
executive branch action). As long as judicial review does not implicate
voiding a congressional act or executive action in a particular case, a
court can readily dismiss the prudential guidance of the last resort
rule. A court confronted with the possibility of voiding legislative (or
executive) action because of constitutional interpretation should gen-
erally resolve the issue subconstitutionally. While the exercise of judi-
cial review would not offend the separation principle, this approach
allows a court to serve the interest of sharing the constitutional inter-
pretive power with other branches.
Circumstances may arise, however, where a court should reach the
constitutionality of the action of other branches even if nonconstitu-
tional grounds remain. For example, even if it required invalidating
legislative or executive action, a court should reject the last resort rule
if it demonstrated that non-majority rights could be redressed only by
reaching the constitutional ground of decision in a particular case. In
2 2 8 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 129 (-The argument is that a judiciary that ducks
controversial issues to preserve its credibility is likely to avoid judicial review where it is needed
most, to restrain highly popular, unconstitutional government action.").
229 See Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 304. See generally Frohnmayer, supra note 66.
23°The Constitution provides for independence of the judicial branch with its guarantees of
life tenure during "good behavior" and no diminution in salary in Article III.
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those circumstances, applying the last resort rule to avoid constitu-
tional adjudication constitutes an abdication of federal courts' coun-
termajoritarian responsibility.
This formulation of the last resort rule will not satisfy those who
conclude that any failure to face a constitutional issue constitutes a
derogation of constitutional duty. It will, however, mediate between
that concern and overly zealous application of the last resort rule based
on justifications which have less force in the modern constitutional
climate, while safeguarding the ability of courts to protect minorities
from some majoritarian decisionmaking. Although the states and the
other branches may not readily accept or appreciate the courts' shar-
ing of the power of constitutional interpretation, the recognition by
courts of others' ability to participate will invite other voices and enrich
the dialogue.
Federalism concerns dictate a similar application of the last resort
rule.
E. Federalism
In addition to maintaining appropriate power relations among the
national branches, the final two justifications for the avoidance doc-
trine also encompass federalism concerns. Federal courts must defer
appropriately to the powers retained by states and their courts. This
comity concern implicates two important applications of the last resort
rule: Pullman abstention and the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine.
1. Pullman Abstention
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., the Texas Railroad
Commission issued an order requiring that white Pullman conductors,
not black Pullman porters, operate sleeping cars.231 Several railroad
companies, and the intervening Pullman porters, challenged the order
as unauthorized by state law and unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the federal Consti-
tution. The Court acknowledged that the "complaint of the Pullman
porters undoubtedly tendered a substantial constitutional issue. '232 But
the Court avoided the issue by abstaining from decision. Justice Frank-
furter wrote:
31312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).232 1d.
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[The equal protection issue] is more than substantial. It touches
a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
open. Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided
if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the
controversy.233
If the Texas Commission had acted beyond the scope of its author-
ity, the order would be declared invalid under Texas law and no court
would need to reach the equal protection issue. Finding the state law
unclear, the Court balked at "making a tentative answer" regarding
Texas law which the Texas Supreme Court could displace the next
day.2M So the Court handed the politically explosive case to the state
court for resolution of state law issues.
Today, if a federal court were presented with a case identical to
Pullman and the parties chose not to press the nonconstitutional claims,
the court, relying on Zobrest, could reach the equal protection claim.
Relying on Siler, the court could decide the state law issues itself; or,
alternatively, it could apply Pullman abstention.2 5 The Court in Pull-
man used abstention both to avoid wasting federal resources on a
"tentative" state law decision and to avoid the "friction of a premature
constitutional adjudication." 2 6 Abstention furthered harmony between
state and federal courts "without the need of rigorous congressional
restriction of those powers."237 This Section rejects efficiency and fear
23Id. "The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court." Id. at 500. Note that this occurs
whenever federal courts decide state law issues, whether under the Siler method, the Erie regime,
or with supplemental jurisdiction.
234 The Court in Pullman remanded the case, with instructions for the lower federal court
to retain jurisdiction, and instructed the parties to file a suit in the Texas courts on the state law
issues. Id. at 501-02.
2Abstention is only warranted in "exceptional circumstances." Colorado River Water Con-
servation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976) (describing different types of
abstention and the circumstances warranting their application). Scholars have catalogued the
inconsistent application of Pullman abstention and questioned itsjustifications. Davies, supra note
142; Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
236 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01 ("These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to
our federal system whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their
authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments'
and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary."). But see Field, supra note 235, at 1078
(discussing "reopener" provisions-possibility of modification led Justice Frankfurter to fear in
Pullman that a federal ruling on the state issue would be "tentative"--because the federal court
could later revise ruling if state law subsequently decided differently in state court).
237Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501. "Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies. .. ." Id. at 500.
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of friction as legitimate grounds for applying Pullman abstention and
concludes that courts should not apply the last resort rule when similar
cases arise in the future.
When courts abstain under Pullman, litigants can eventually re-
turn to a federal court-where plaintiff commenced the litigation-if
resolution of the federal constitutional claim is necessary after consid-
eration of other grounds for disposal of the case. Under Pullman
abstention, the claims of the litigants are either resolved without con-
stitutional adjudication or constitutional adjudication is deferred.23 8
The federal court could dispose of the case on nonconstitutional
grounds with more efficiency for the litigants and the two court systems
if it followed the Siler route. Of course, efficiency is only gained when
the case can be disposed of on the state law ground. If the litigation
returns eventually to federal court, and the federal court must overrule
the state court on constitutional grounds, inefficiency and friction are
increased.23 9
Alternatively, the Court could have avoided ruling on the state law
issue entirely in Pullman by addressing the equal protection claim. It
may have been more efficient for the Court to rule that even if the
Texas statute was construed to afford the commission power to enact
such a regulation, the statute and the regulation violated the United
States Constitution. Moreover, the avoidance of the constitutional ques-
tion by either federal or state court in a first litigation may increase
long-term judicial inefficiency because any issue deferred will likely
arise in later litigation.
The Courtjustified abstention in Pullman primarily because of the
"sensitive social nature" of the integration issue, an issue on which a
ruling from the Court in favor of the porters would not have met with
widespread majority acceptance in 1943.240 Alternatively, the Court
could have affirmed segregationist principles if it upheld the order.
But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 594 ("In fact, where Congress desired federal court
abstention it enacted particular statutes such as... the Anti-Injunction Act, the Tax Injunction
Act, and theJohnson Act.").
235Thus, Pullman abstention may be viewed as less problematic in terms of assuring federal
rights than other forms of abstention, where there is no final resort to a federal court for federal
claims. With Burford abstention, a federal court completely defers to related state court litigation.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (Justice Frankfurter, author of the Court's opinion
in Pullman, vehemently dissented in Burford).
3 Field, supra note 235, at 1081-82.
24 0Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts
Jurisprudence at theEnd of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1038-39 (1994) (discuss-
ing the racial, gender and class assumptions underlying the Court's definition of the problem as
a "sensitive social issue").
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The Court deemed the public interest best served by a deferred,
delayed resolution of the equal protection issue. This fear of friction
is closely linked to the Court's concern with its credibility and finding
majority acceptance for its decisions, and is greatly exaggerated in a
responsive system of constitutional dialogue.241 Moreover, as argued
above, decisions of certain constitutional issues, particularly those in-
volving minority rights, may never find widespread acceptance, and
action by the federal courts may be necessary to foster acceptance of
such rights. From a post-Brown perspective, the Pullman litigants suf-
fered from the Railroad Commission's racist policy while they awaited
the Texas court's decision on state law matters.242 Such delay causes not
only prolonged harm if the conduct is found unconstitutional, 243 but
the Court fails to give guidance on critical constitutional questions.
The delay also increases the expense of challenging the conduct, with
litigants generally bearing their own costs.244 The Court countenanced
this delay although it recognized that the porters' claim was substantial.
Additionally, the Court may have misperceived the public interest
in Pullman. Abstention disserves a public interest in earlier and more
frequent court participation in constitutional dialogue.24 5 The Court,
241 See supra Sections IV.A-B addressing finality and legitimacy concerns.
2 42 See Michael Wells, Preliminary Injunctions and Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 65 (1977). Both the minority Pullman porters and the railroads were presumably
subject to the unconstitutional conduct.
243 The countermajoritarian role of the federal courts dictates a duty to address exactly those
types of questions speedily in order to protect effectively the rights of minorities. See England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)
('Time has a particularly noxious effect on explosive civil rights questions, where the problem
only festers as grievances pile high and the law takes its slow, expensive pace to decide in years
what should be decided promptly.").
244 See England, 375 U.S. at 425 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit, let
alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure way of
defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic exercise.
There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law questions
involved in federal court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent unique and
rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which Congress has
empowered to act.
Id. (DouglasJ, concurring) (quoting his own dissenting opinion in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363
U.S. 207, 228 (1960)); see also Field, supra note 223, at 599-602.
245 In DeFunis v. Odegaard, Justice Brennan dissented from dismissal as moot of a challenge
to a university's affirmative action policy by a white male who was denied admission to the
University of Washington Law School:
[I]n endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court clearly disserves the
public interest. The constitutional issues which are avoided today concern vast
numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and universities .... Few constitu-
tional questions in recent history have stirred as much debate, and they will not
disappear. They must inevitably return to the federal courts and ultimately again
to this Court .... Although the Court should, of course, avoid unnecessary consti-
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for example, may assure federal fights via constitutional interpreta-
tion.2 46 Of course, those who place a high value on majority acceptance
and avoiding friction would agree that by the time the equal protection
issue deferred in Pullman surfaced again, the country was more accept-
ing of the result. Bickel argued that letting a constitutional problem
"simmer" yields a better decision, reasoning that the Court's consid-
eration of a number of cases demonstrating the problem, "may have a
cumulative effect on the judicial mind as well as on public and profes-
sional opinion. '247 We can argue, for example, whether the Brown v.
Board of Education decision was better because it was informed by
previous litigation. Many would agree that while the public was more
prepared for the Court's decision in 1954, Brown still did not meet with
widespread acceptance. If the Court had found an equal protection
violation in Pullman, resistance to desegregation might have been even
more fervent and extended than it has been. On the other hand, an
equal protection ruling in 1943 may have sped school integration and
obviated the need for Brown.
Scholars have questioned whether allocating power among state
and federal courts through Pullman abstention promotes harmony.248
Overburdened state courts might not always appreciate deferral of
controversial cases from the often less busy federal courts. 249 The other
comity rationale for abstention in Pullman was to further harmony
between state and federal courts "without the need of rigorous con-
gressional restriction of those powers." 250 In cases where Pullman ab-
stention might apply, state and federal court jurisdiction is concurrent.
The litigants first chose the federal forum, and Congress and/or the
tutional questions, we should not transform principles of avoidance of constitu-
tional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of difficult cases.
416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan,J., dissenting). The controversial issue did, of course, return
to the Supreme Court several years later in Regents of the University of California v. Baake, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
246 For example, the Court's perhaps unnecessary decision of a constitutional question in
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., served an interest in assuring
certainty of rights and enabling the private development of nuclear power. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Likewise, because the Court did not invalidate legislation, it can be argued that separation of
powers concerns were not greatly implicated.
247 Bcvrm, supra note 57, at 176.
248 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 596; Field, supra note 235, at 1090.
249Judicial efficiency does not appear directly in the Supreme Court's justifications of the
avoidance doctrine. Whether Pullman abstention increases efficiency depends on whether reso-
lution of the state law issue obviates the need for a federal law ruling and, even if only the state
law issue is decided, whether it takes fewer resources initially to resolve that issue than the federal
law issue. The Texas court in Pullman, for example, might not have appreciated the Court
conserving its resources and the lower federal courts' resources while adding to the workload of
the state court.
2°OPullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
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states approved the availability of that choice with their jurisdictional
statutes. When a federal court shuttles the case to the state system it
undercuts legislative intent. Unless Congress alters the diversity juris-
diction statute, the federal courts have the duty to hear many state law
questions, and discretion to decide state law issues under the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute.2 1 To the extent that the Court justified
abstention in Pullman in order to allow the Texas Supreme Court,
rather than a federal court, to decide the case, it failed to follow the
directive of Congress in refusing to abolish diversity and supplemental
jurisdiction.252 If federal court decision of state law causes undue fed-
eralism concerns, Congress can restrict federal jurisdiction over the
state law issues or require federal courts to follow state statutes provid-
ing for certification of state law questions to state courts. 2 3
Moreover, the factual context of the Pullman litigation demon-
strates why the federal courts must sometimes refuse to follow the last
resort rule. Even if abstention promoted harmony among state and
federal courts, that harmony must be weighed against the harm in
refusing to decide the equal protection challenge. A result favorable
to the porters and the railroad-admittedly an uncertain proposition
in 1943--might have sped desegregation. 254 As with the separation of
powers concern, federal courts need not hesitate to face a constitu-
tional issue based on federalism concerns unless judicial review might
require a court to invalidate state legislative or executive action. When
the need to invalidate state action to uphold the federal Constitution
arises, the efficiency rationale and the concern for judicial credibility
do not sufficiently justify abstention. Congressional revision ofjurisdic-
tion comity can address these concerns. Federal court examination of
the constitutional question in Pullman was necessary to ensure that
decision of the federal constitutional claims of minorities was not
unduly postponed. The Court's refusal to hear the equal protection
claim as a prudential matter evidences the majoritarian bias inherent
in the caution of the last resort rule. An equal protection decision by
21 Congress could amend or abolish the diversity and/or supplemental jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. Under Erie, federal courts frequently rule on state questions. Many states
have procedures whereby federal courts can certify novel or complex questions of state law to
the state's supreme court.
252 See Redish, supra note 197, at 76.
2 Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federal-
ism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671 (1992) (espousing federalism justification for limiting diversity jurisdic-
tion).
254 The Court has recognized that the avoidance doctrine requires balancing the individual
interest in assurance of rights against other concerns. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA.,
331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
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the Court-however it came out on the merits in 1943-would have
advanced the constitutional dialogue.
2. The Adequate and Independent State Ground Doctrine
In contrast to Pullman abstention, one branch of the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine constitutes appropriate appli-
cation of the last resort rule.25 5 The branch dealing with parallel state
and federal constitutional provisions has developed in a manner that
accords sufficient regard for comity interests while preserving ade-
quate federal court review of constitutional claims. The branch of the
doctrine dealing with state procedural foreclosure, however, is more
problematic.
The Supreme Court is entitled to review all federal issues, includ-
ing constitutional issues, on appeal from a final judgment of the high-
est state courts in order to preserve federal supremacy and advance
uniformity in federal law.2 56 The Court will refuse to hear a case,
however, if an adequate and independent state ground supports the
decision. By deferring to state court decisions based on an adequate
and independent state ground, the doctrine addresses Brandeis' con-
cern of federal judicial interference with state authority. The doctrine
is generally grounded in efforts to avoid advisory opinions and unnec-
essary constitutional rulings, 25 7 and the premise of according sufficient
respect to the authority of state courts.258 It applies only when litigation
255 Now that Congress has removed the Court's duty to hear cases from state courts raising
federal constitutional issues or denying federal rights, we may see less frequent use of the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine.256 See Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (ensuring uniformity of federal
law and promoting protection of federal rights justify Supreme Court review of federal law issues
on appeal from state courts). The finality requirement for review of cases from state courts is
likewise premised in part on avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (basis for the 28 U.S.C. § 1257 finality rule was that it
prevented the Court from passing on constitutional issues that may be dissipated by the final
outcome of a case, thereby helping to keep undesirable federal-state conflicts to a minimum).
Contra Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) ("Without immediate review of the
California holding by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the federal issue and as
a result 'there would remain in effect the unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court'
holding that the California statute does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act.").
2 5 7Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1071 (1983) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (avoidance doctrine
also supports practice of remanding a case to state court for clarification of whether judgment
rests on an adequate and independent state ground) ("We do not sit to expound our under-
standing of the Constitution to interested listeners in the legal community; we sit to resolve
disputes. If it is not apparent that our views would affect the outcome of a particular case, we
cannot presume to interfere."); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936);
see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("And our power is to correct wrongjudgments,
not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion .... ).258While Supreme Court review of federal issues promotes protection of federal rights and
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begins in state courts rather than the lower federal courts. This could
be because of a desire to proceed in state court or because Congress
has limited the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.2 59
The first branch of the doctrine commonly applies where state
and federal constitutional provisions are implicated. Critics argue that
state courts can use the doctrine to insulate their judgments from
Supreme Court review and that protection from state courts is some-
times necessary.26° However, because the federal Constitution imposes
a floor beneath which states' rights-protection cannot fall, the only
state decisions that can be insulated from federal review are decisions
in which the state court is more rights-generous than is required by
the federal Constitution. In other words, a state court decision, based
on state law grounds, denying a rights-claimant relief that he or she
claims under the federal Constitution, is not an adequate state ground
under this branch of the doctrine.261 The Court retains the ability to
determine if the state ground is truly adequate and independent of
federal law.
Indeed, the Court's present application of this branch of the
doctrine presumes that the state court relied on federal law unless the
state court plainly bases its decision on a bona fide adequate and
independent state ground. This approach has been criticized as ad-
vancing the Court's power at the expense of state courts and departing
from the time-honored practice of reserving decision on federal con-
stitutional issues. 262 State courts can protect against this presumption,
uniformity in federal law, state judges have the primary responsibility for developing state law.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41. It is unclear whether the doctrine is merely a prudential restraint or
a constitutional limitation. Compare Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common
Law, FederalJurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrini; 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 1291 (1986) (doctrine is federal procedural common law and can
be modified) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448-76 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (tie Court
would exceed its powers under Article III to determine federal questions if nonfederal questions
were adequate to sustain the judgment).
anFor example, Congress has limited the jurisdiction of lower federal courts by leaving
criminal prosecutions largely to the states.260 See generally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 258. See also Linde, supra note 72, at 381-82;
David A. Logan, JudicialFederalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. REv. 453 (1988).
261 The Supreme Court must examine whether the state court's denial of federal constitu-
tional protection, albeit on non-federal grounds, "rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsub-
stantial, constitutional obligations may not thus be evaded." Broad River Power Co. v. South
Carolina, 281 U.S. 537,540 (1930); seeIndiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100, 107-09
(1938) (state law determination did not constitute an adequate and independent state ground
because it would have made Contract Clause of federal constitution a "dead letter"; after making
the federal law pronouncement in favor of plaintiff, Court nevertheless remanded for state court
to determine whether plaintiff had used wrong procedure under state law to bring her claim).
262Justice Stevens has eloquently catalogued criticism of this presumption of Supreme Court
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however, by not relying on federal constitutional law arguments or
precedent.2 63 State law could thus, in some circumstances, develop
differently from federal law as a response to federal constitutional
rulings.2 6An active Supreme Court, one that reaches for constitutional
issues, might stimulate state supreme courts to find independent and
adequate state grounds for their rulings and thereby promote consti-
tutional dialogue at the state level.
The application of the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine in cases involving state procedural foreclosure is more trou-
blesome. In such instances, failure to adhere to a state procedural rule
is often deemed an adequate basis to avoid Supreme Court review of
a federal constitutional claim.2 65 State procedural law is thus allowed
to frustrate federal constitutional rights because of the decision to
respect state procedural rules.2 6
6
The second major criticism of the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine is that it contributes to inaccuracy and inconsistency
appellate jurisdiction absent a clear statement of an adequate and independent state basis for
the judgment. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 690-701 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the clear statement rule of Long). Justice Stevens argued that this presumption
contravenes the "avoidance principle" because, in applying the presumption, the Court will
decide federal issues at times when a state issue was not clearly decided. Id at 691-94. Stevens
commends the practice of state courts first considering, and preferring, state grounds of decision.
I. at 701-08 (citing, among many examples, State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983)).
Prior to the presumption, the Court would often remand cases to state courts for clarification of
the record on state law issues prior to deciding any federal constitutional issue. Long, 463 U.S.
at 1038-39 (Court notes that it has, among other things, dismissed, vacated or continued state
cases for clarification of the nature of the state court decisions); see, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (ambiguous record and complex state law issue remanded to
state court for state law clarification).
263 Hans Linde argues that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to examine
state law first. Until a claimant's right has been fully adjudicated under state law-including state
constitutional law-the state has not denied her the claimed right. In his analysis, there simply
is no federal question until the state courtjudgment denies the right. Linde, supra note 72. See
Hans A. Linde, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History by Bernard Shwartz, 52 OR. L. REv. 325
(1973) (book review) for an argument that lower federal courts also should inquire into state
constitutional guarantees when plaintiffs attack state action on federal constitutional grounds.
Critics of this position argue that the state denies the right at the time of the allegedly unconsti-
tutional action itself rather than at the moment that judicial vindication fails. A rich dialogue
urges state constitutional development. See, e.g., Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S. CAL L. REv. 750 (1972); PeterJ. Galie & Lawrence P. Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DicK. L.
REv. 273 (1978); Kahn, supra note 181; David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 "hmp. L.Q.
1197 (1992).
264See cases cited in note 180 supra.
265Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1965); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375,
389-91 (1955).266 Henry, 379 U.S. at 453-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
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in federal law because state courts' erroneous interpretations of federal
law remain on the books as long as the judgment is supported by an
adequate and independent state ground.2 67 The state court's rulings
on federal law, however, arguably amount to no more than dicta be-
cause those rulings do not provide the basis for the judgment. The
Supreme Court might promote uniformity by addressing constitutional
claims even when a judgment is supported by adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds. The ability of the Court, however, to promote
uniformity effectively is questionable in our large nation.2  In any
event, uniformity may not always be desirable. The constitutional dia-
logue may be advanced by a multiplicity of pronouncements from state
and federal courts on federal constitutional law.269
Like Pullman abstention, the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine may disrupt and delay the vindication of federal
rights, and make litigation of federal rights less efficient because of
prolonged state proceedings and federal review.2 0 These concerns are
less troubling in this context because the litigation begins in state
court. Either that choice is voluntary and litigants could avoid the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine by going to federal
court initially, or that initial choice is restricted by congressional juris-
dictional allocations and deference to state law in particular areas.
Congress can alter such allocations in light of restrictions imposed by
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine. Of course, it is
unlikely that Congress will take significant criminal prosecution re-
sponsibilities away from the states because of the problems posed by
the procedural foreclosure branch of the doctrine. Congress no longer
requires the Court to review state decisions denying federal rights, and
state courts are largely left with the responsibility for protecting federal
rights. Instead, the Court should revise its prudential rule of last resort
by determining that procedural grounds which foreclose federal review
267 See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 258, at 1314-15.
26sFurther, critics argue that the clear statement rule in Michigan v. Long does not assist in
providing uniformity for federal law. 463 U.S. 1032, 1070 (1983) (StevensJ, dissenting) ("'need
for uniformity in federal law' is truly an ungovernable engine").
269 Congress, in conferring concurrentjurisdiction for many federal claims, may indicate that
state courts are just as competent as federal courts at protecting federal rights. Commentators
have debated parity concerns extensively. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defin-
ing a Role for theFederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) (reviewing literature on parity);
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. Ray. 1105 (1977).
270 Henry, 379 U.S. at 455-57 (BlackJ, dissenting); seeTerrance Sandalow, Henry v. Missis-
sippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187,
206-07.
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of federal claims are inadequate. By deeming procedural grounds
inadequate, the Court avoids the advisory opinion problem.
Because the Supreme Court may ultimately review state decisions
denying relief under the federal Constitution based on parallel state
constitutional grounds, the first branch of the doctrine is a more easily
justified application of the last resort rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal and state courts are often presented with both federal and
state law claims in a single case. This can occur when a federal court,
for example, exercises diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Similarly,
courts often face federal statutory, regulatory or federal common law
claims in conjunction with constitutional claims. Courts should not
reflexively heed the maxim that federal constitutional grounds should
be avoided whenever possible. Instead, appropriate application of the
last resort rule requires that judicial discretion be guided primarily by
considerations of separation of powers and comity. As long as judicial
review does not implicate voiding legislative or executive action, a
federal court should not use the last resort rule to avoid a constitu-
tional issue. A court confronted with the possibility of voiding legisla-
tive (or executive) action because of constitutional interpretation, how-
ever, should generally resolve the case subconstitutionally by use of the
last resort rule. This approach allows a court to choose to share the
constitutional interpretive power with other branches. Nevertheless, if
it is necessary for a court to invalidate legislative or executive action in
order to fulfill its critical function of protecting non-majority rights, the
court should disregard the prudential guidance of the last resort rule.
For example, a court might refuse to apply the last resort rule
when parties seek to clarify a highly contentious issue of public impor-
tance and no invalidation of legislative or executive action is required.
In Zobrest, public school districts, states, the United States, private
schools, disabled children and their families were interested in the
Establishment Clause principles announced by the Court. The Court
concluded that the Constitution allowed, rather than prohibited, gov-
ernmental conduct. The Court did not invalidate congressional legis-
lation with its decision. Accordingly, Congress can respond by clarify-
ing what the IDEA requires and other political actors can determine
whether they are willing to fund assistance for disabled children in
private schools. Thus, the Court was appropriately less constrained in
addressing the constitutional issue.
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Similarly, federalism concerns justify flexible use of the last resort
rule. At least one branch of the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine appropriately defers to state courts' development of
state law and congressional control ofjurisdiction.
The Pullman decision, on the other hand, demonstrates why the
federal courts must sometimes refuse to follow the last resort rule
despite comity concerns. Whatever the outcome of a 1943 equal pro-
tection decision, it would have enhanced the constitutional dialogue.
Courts may evaluate separation of powers and comity concerns
differently, or find other justifications for the last resort rule more
persuasive. Whatever their value choices, courts should offer reasoned
explanations of necessity. If a court relies on the last resort rule to avoid
a constitutional issue, it should do so expressly and explain its decision.
This will signal to other federal branches, the states and the public
that, although the court has the power to decide this issue, it has
declined to do so for prudential reasons. If a court reaches a constitu-
tional issue when nonconstitutional grounds remain, it should similarly
explain why that action was appropriate. The court should clarify that,
for example, separation of powers or comity concerns were not greatly
implicated, or the court needed to find legislation unconstitutional in
order to protect minority rights. This should serve to invite others to
explore opportunities for responding to the decision and encourage
them to partake in the constitutional conversation.
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